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Cross-border ground raids by state-backed security forces can have a detrimental impact 
on guerrillas’ ability to wage war. External support in neighboring countries can be an 
important source of strength to insurgent forces. However, cross-border raids and their 
security gains come at a political cost. This thesis examines the conflicts in Malaya 
(1946–1950), Nicaragua (1981–1990), Algeria (1954–1962), Namibia (1960–1989), 
South Vietnam (1960–1975), and Afghanistan (1978–1992) to identify operational and 
strategic-level considerations in planning cross-border operations to reduce the political 
costs of such operations. The study examines the relationship between security gains and 
political costs, including subsets of factors intrinsic to both variables. The research 
presents lessons applicable to the contemporary counterterrorism environment and 
suggests how military and political counterinsurgents can combine lines of effort in 
conducting cross-border operations against external insurgent sanctuaries. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Attacking insurgent sanctuaries with ground forces across international borders is 
often thought of as “a bridge too far,” but in fact such attacks can be only a decision 
away. On 30 March 1986, the 334th and the 154th Spetsnaz battalions crossed the border 
into Pakistan in order to attack a Mujahedeen base camp.1 After fierce fighting by both 
sides, on 2 April, Soviet forces withdrew completely from the battlefield after failing to 
locate two missing Russian soldiers. Casualty figures from both sides are inaccurate, but 
Mujahedeen losses were anywhere from 33 to 300 killed and 40 wounded, while Soviet 
losses are believed to be at least 60 killed, with two missing in action. The operation itself 
was not sanctioned by higher levels of Soviet military leadership. However, overt 
political objections from Pakistan were minimal, with only a brief synopsis of events 
outlined in the Pakistani Strategic Studies Review and no political backlash.   
Other nations have also used cross-border ground raids to attack insurgent 
havens.2 While such raids can be operationally beneficial, they can entail political costs. 
It appears that cross-border raids can undermine the counterinsurgents’ legitimacy, as in 
the tribal areas of Pakistan in recent years. These incidents highlight the delicate 
operational and political implications of cross-border raids. On one hand, ground raids 
can reduce the sustainability of an insurgency by removing insurgent sanctuaries. On the 
other hand, they can result in restrictive political consequences that compromise the 
counterinsurgents’ freedom of movement and political legitimacy. This thesis examines 
how cross-border raids can be conducted to improve counterinsurgency efforts while 
minimizing negative political consequences. 
                                                 
1 Lester W. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, “Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta: Spetsnaz Strike into 
Pakistan During the Soviet-Afghan War,” accessed 10 August 2012, http://fmso.leavenworth.army 
.mil/documents/Krer-SOF.pdf. This account can also be found in Lester W. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, 
“Vignette 12 – Krer One” and “Vignette 13 – Krer Two,” in The Other Side of The Mountain: Mujahideen 
Tactics In The Soviet-Afghan War, Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, Studies and Analysis Division, 1999, 
327–334.  
2 See Table 9 in the Appendix for a list of observed cross-border raids between 1945 and 2002.  
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the key strategic and operational considerations when planning and 
executing cross-border ground raids against insurgent sanctuaries? 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
 The purpose of this thesis is to identify strategic and operational considerations 
that maximize the effectiveness of cross-border raids during counterinsurgency conflicts. 
This same logic will be applied in order to decide when not to conduct cross-border raids. 
This study focuses on insurgencies that began and ended between 1945 and 2002. This 
time period encompasses the rise of airpower as a viable means of attacking remote 
internal insurgent sanctuaries, bringing to the forefront questions of violation of national 
sovereignty. Such operations can have far-reaching consequences outside the context of a 
regional conflict. Cases include examples with varying degrees of similarity between 
actors and regions in order to identify similarities across different environments. 
C. FRAMEWORK 
 The fundamental approach to the research question is to correlate the sub-fields 
within political costs and security gains from a set of case studies, and then extrapolate 
and analyze the strategic and operational considerations in order to identify themes. In 
order to determine whether cross-border raids against insurgent safe havens are effective, 
an understanding of the social and military dynamics are necessary for framing the 
primary categories of implications. For the purpose of this thesis, politics and the security 
environment are the two primary categories for judging the applicability and 
effectiveness of cross-border raids. These two categories account for the larger strategic 
implications within a national political framework and in developing preferred 
operational considerations in the counterinsurgent theater of war. These two variables are 
also operational variables for analyzing the operational environment within the U.S. 
Army Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical 
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Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT) model which is “critical to developing a 
counterinsurgency plan that can defeat the insurgency.”3 
 In defining the political and security environments, with the emphasis on security, 
it is necessary to understand the balance between political cost and security gain. One is 
inverse of the other, in that a stake in one will order a cost in the other. The balance 
between the two interests can make one less costly at the expense of the other, depending 
on the environment of the decision maker in a given situation. Figure 1 displays the 
expected tradeoff between the political cost and the security gain. The line of equilibrium 
can become more steep, or less, depending on the context of the conflict. The aim of this 
thesis is to identify strategic and political considerations that can lower the slope. The 
lower the slope, the more security gains for less political cost. 
 
 
Figure 1.  The Dichotomy Scale4 
 In order to identify a set of optimal strategic political considerations, four 
subcategories are used to classify utility. First, national will is measured in order to 
correlate popular support for the sitting policy makers in the conduct of the conflict. It is 
initially hypothesized that as popular support grows, the likelihood that policy makers 
                                                 
3 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3–24.2: Tactics in Counterinsurgency (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 2009), 1–3. 
4 Political cost is a sitting government’s lack of domestic or international legitimacy affecting its 
ability to govern and wage a just war. Security gains are those actions which reduce the violence against an 
indigenous population supported by the government or against the government’s forces. 
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will take bolder actions increases. Second, information is defined as the information 
linking a particular objective to the conflict. The more effectively an over-the-border 
objective is linked to the counterinsurgency effort, the more the administration is justified 
in conducting a raid against the site. However, dissemination of information must be 
controlled. If too much negative information is generated as a result of the operation, it 
can have negative effects. The third subcategory is duration. When examining cross-
border raids, duration is the overall time spent conducting such operations within the 
larger context of the conflict. The tradeoff here can be that too little time spent on the 
operation may have little or no impact on the overall campaign, while too much time 
spent across the border can lead to cries of occupation, or war expansion. The fourth sub-
component, force size, is similar in this respect. Too large a force can lead to concern 
about resource expenditure and threat of a wider war, and too little can invite criticism of 
internal political posturing and manipulation. The psychological impact of cross-border 
raids cannot be ignored. However, it is not included in the scope of this thesis because 
sources to make viable comparisons are not available. Figure 2 shows a graphical 
representation of the projected correlation between these factors and political returns.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Subcategories of Politics 
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 The security environment can be characterized by a similar subset of categories 
(Figure 3). Operational and tactical information are intertwined and depend on good 
intelligence collection. The more information available to an operational command, the 
more likely their cross-border operations will reduce violence in the contested region. 
This study does not address the relationship between intelligence collection and time 
(time-sensitive intelligence with an expiration date) because this thesis does not focus on 
single tactical actions. However, the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, and Analyze (F3EA) 
model is applicable to the current investigation, and its application to intelligence 
analysis is addressed.5  
The operational area is related to the issue of war expansion. At some point the 
number of cross-border sites attacked will push the insurgent force off-balance. However, 
if an expedition is too large, the insurgent force will simply relocate, thus nullifying the 
effectiveness of cross-border raids. As the insurgent force retreats into other sanctuaries, 
the state force can be portrayed as invading a neighboring country. Mission duration and 
force size have similar second and third-order effects. If duration is too short, or force 
size too small, the counterinsurgency will produce negligible impacts. If the force is too 
large or the duration too long, the excessive damage, both material and human, will 
outweigh the objective of the operation, causing more harm than good.   
                                                 
5 William Rosenau and Austin Long, The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency, 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. The description of F3EA is drawn from Raymon T. 
Odierno, Nichoel E. Brooks, and Francesco P. Mastracchio, “ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater,” Joint 
Forces Quarterly, no. 50 (Third Quarter 2008), pp. 51–55, and from Michael Flynn, Rich Juergens, and 
Thomas Cantrell, “Employing ISR SOF Best Practices,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 50 (Third Quarter 
2008), p. 57. 
 6 
 
Figure 3.  Security Environment 
 
Time is the final factor analyzed across the political and security realms. Time is 
objectively measured as the occurrence of cross-border raids within the larger time frame 
of the conflict. The study describes whether cross-border raids were conducted in the 
early, middle, or late stages of the conflict, and correlates the timing with political and 
security returns. Figure 4 displays hypothesized returns over time. Raids conducted too 
early may affect the national political narrative and early accusations of war expansion. 
Raids conducted late in a campaign can deliver the final blow to a failing insurgency but 




Figure 4.  Time: Returns Versus Duration 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
 Eighty-nine insurgencies described in a RAND Counterinsurgency (COIN) study 
were reviewed for possible inclusion in this thesis.6 The following criteria defined 
classification as an insurgency. 
1. The fighting was between states and non-state actors seeking control of a 
government or region or to use violence to change government policies. 
2. At least 1,000 people were killed over the course of the conflict, with yearly 
averages of at least 100 deaths. 
3. At least 100 people were killed on both sides, including civilians attacked by 
rebels. 
4. The conflicts were not coups, countercoups, or insurrections.  
  
An additional requirement for inclusion in this study is the use of cross-border raids. A 
cross-border raid is defined as the deliberate violation of an international border by a 
government-supported assault force against an insurgent sanctuary. This study focuses on 
cross-border raids that use ground troops, as these are usually considered more serious 
                                                 
6 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of 
Success in Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010). The list was drawn from 
Martin C. Libicki, “Eighty-Nine Insurgencies: Outcomes and Endings,” in David C. Gompert, et al., War 
by Other Means – Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency: RAND 
Counterinsurgency Study – Final Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).  
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violations of national sovereignty. Also, ground assault forces have the capability to 
exploit intelligence findings on the objective. Strikes by government supported aircraft 
are excluded because airstrikes cannot adequately exploit intelligence gathered on the 
ground, nor can they influence local populations through interpersonal relations. Ongoing 
counterinsurgencies that are not part of the RAND COIN study list are excluded because 
they take place after 2002 and thus fall outside the time frame established for this 
research. Recent ongoing insurgencies are included in Table 9, in the Appendix, and may 
be of interest to other researchers.   
 When a warring party resides within the borders of a nation-state or a third-party 
neighbor, the sovereignty violation is arguably not as severe as the cases examined in this 
study. If the two parties are already at war, border violations are a predictable 
consequence of their armed conflict. This thesis identifies whether cross-border raids in 
the 89 insurgencies met the “three-party rule.” The three-party criterion for case selection 
is that a third country (country A, effectively an external actor) is fighting an insurgency 
in country B, in support of country B’s inhabitants, and conducts a cross-border raid into 
country C.  
 Consideration of cross-border raids also involves scrutinizing decisions not to 
conduct cross-border raids. Such decisions are more difficult to evaluate because 
documentation and sources are more limited. To deal with this difficulty, this thesis 
discusses public discussion of cross-border raids and public support for hostilities. Public 
attitudes toward raids and the hostilities in general show the context of military and 
political decision-making. Accordingly, this study examines the impact on cross-border 
raids of public support as revealed in polls and other indicators of opinion. 
 For each case, the RAND researchers identified a government “win,” a “mixed 
outcome,” or a “government loss.” The win/mixed outcome/loss determination by the 
RAND study is as follows.   
First, for each case, we asked whether the government against which the 
insurgency arose had stayed in power through the end of the conflict and 
whether it retained sovereignty over the region of conflict. If insurgents 
either deposed (or otherwise led to the fall of) the government or won de 
facto control of a separatist region, then the COIN force did not win. If the 
government remained in power and the country remained intact, then we 
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further considered whether the government had been forced to (or chose 
to) make major concessions to the insurgents, such as power sharing or 
loss of territory or other sovereign control, or was otherwise forced to 
yield to insurgent demands. If the government stayed in power, the 
country remained intact, and no major concessions were granted to the 
insurgents, then the COIN force unambiguously won. If, however, major 
concessions were made, then the outcome was mixed. In all cases, what 
constituted a “major” concession and who (the COIN force or the 
insurgents) had the better of a mixed outcome was decided at the 
discretion of the individual case analyst and was based on the distinct 
narrative of that case.7  
 
 The decision tree is presented in Figure 8, in the Appendix.8 This thesis analyzes 
cases of cross-border raids with all three possible outcomes (government wins, mixed 
outcomes, and government losses). The cases are chosen from among those with 
adequate research material available from English language sources.  
The characteristics of cross-border raids are isolated to permit identification of 
key decision making points and conditions in which cross-border raids are most and least 
effective. The research does not assume that cross-border raids are the only determinant 
of success or failure in an insurgent conflict. 
 The best case studies were identified by excluding non-viable cases that fail to 
meet the three-party rule or are currently ongoing. The following insurgencies were 
excluded for those reasons. 
 
Insurgency Start Year 
End 





Philippines (HUK Rebellion) 1946 1955 
 
Kosovo 1996 1999 
Burma 1948 2006 
 
Nepal 1997 2006 
Kenya 1952 1956 
 
Congo (anti-Kabila) 1998 2003 
Indonesia (Daru Islam) 1958 1960 
 
China 1934 1950 
Lebanon 1958 1959 
 
Cuba 1953 1959 
Tibet 1959 1974 
 
Eritrea 1960 1993 
Congo/Katanga 1960 1965 
 
South Africa 1960 1994 
Guatemala 1960 1996 
 
Angolan Independence 1962 1974 
Iraq Kurdistan 1961 1974 
 
Guinea-Bissau 1962 1974 
Uruguay 1963 1973 
 
Mozambique Independence 1962 1974 
                                                 
7 Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, 8. 
8 Paul, Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, 9. 
 10 
Biafran Secession 1967 1970 
 
Zimbabwe 1965 1980 
Argentina 1968 1979 
 
Cambodia 1968 1975 
Northern Ireland 1969 1999 
 
Bangladesh 1971 1972 
Jordan 1970 1971 
 
Nicaragua 1978 1979 
Philippines (MNLF) 1971 1996 
 
Somalia 1980 1991 
Balochistan 1973 1977 
 
Sudan (SPLA) 1984 2004 
Morocco 1975 1991 
 
Liberia 1989 1997 
Indonesia (Aceh) 1976 2005 
 
Moldova 1990 1992 
Philippines (MILF) 1977 2006 
 
Rwanda 1990 1994 
Peru 1981 1992 
 
Afghanistan (post-Soviet) 1992 1996 
Uganda (ADF) 1986 2000 
 
Afghanistan (Taliban) 1996 2001 
Algeria (GIA) 1992 2004 
 
Zaire (anti-Mobutu) 1996 1997 
Croatia 1992 1995 
 
Colombia (FARC) 1963 Ongoing 
Colombia (La Violencia) 1948 1962 
 
Philippines (NPA) 1969 Ongoing 
Yemen 1962 1970 
 
India Northeast 1975 Ongoing 
Dominican Republic 1965 1966 
 
Sri Lanka 1976 Ongoing 
East Timor 1975 2000 
 
India-Naxalite 1980 Ongoing 
Lebanese Civil War 1975 1990 
 
Uganda (LRA) 1987 Ongoing 
Kampuchea 1978 1992 
 
Kashmir 1989 Ongoing 
El Salvador 1979 1992 
 
Nigeria (Niger Delta) 1991 Ongoing 
Senegal 1980 2002 
 
Somalian (post-Barre) 1991 Ongoing 
Papua New Guinea 1988 1998 
 
Chechnya II 1999 Ongoing 
Bosnia 1992 1995 
 
Israel 2000 Ongoing 
Georgia/Abkhazia 1992 1994 
 
Afghanistan (anti-Coalition) 2001 Ongoing 
Nagorno-Karabakh 1992 1994 
 
Ivory Coast 2002 Ongoing 
Tajikistan 1992 1997 
 
Darfur 2003 Ongoing 
Burundi 1993 2003 
 
Iraq 2003 Ongoing 
Chechnya I 1994 1996   South Thailand 2004 Ongoing 
Table 1.   Select Non-Viable Cases 
In addition, the use of airpower instead of ground troops disqualifies Greece 
1945–1949, Angola (UNITA) 1975–2002, and Sierra Leone 1991–2002. The Indochina 
conflict from 1946 to 1954 is excluded because of its tie to colonialism, as well as the 
lack of clear national borders at the time of the campaign. Laos 1960–1975 is excluded 
because with numerous external actors, the case is too complex. Mozambique 
(RENAMO) 1976–1995 is eliminated because the insurgent force lacked sanctuaries 
outside of the conflict area. Finally, Turkey (PKK), 1984–1999, is omitted because 
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Kurdistan lies within the sovereign borders of Iraq and thus the case does not meet the 
three-party criterion. The remaining cases for analysis are presented in Table 2.  
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II. MALAYA (1948–1960) 
 The Malayan Emergency, fought between the Communists insurgents led by Chin 
Peng, and the British colonial Malayan government, is an example of an environment 
where cross-border raids were not instrumental to the cessation of hostilities within the 
larger counterinsurgency framework. The British/Malayan government victory was 
achieved through the application of policies internal to the borders of Malaya. This 
chapter describes the Malayan emergency and discusses the role of cross-border raids less 
developed nations with large internal sanctuaries.9 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 The Malayan Emergency began in March 1948 when the Malayan Communist 
Party (MCP), led by Chin Peng, began a campaign of terror and murder against the 
British and their Malayan partners in Malaya. Originally called the Malayan National 
Liberation Army (MNLA), in February 1949 the guerrilla force was renamed the 
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in an effort to gain outside support by 
expanding the group’s appeal to different ethnic groups. Throughout the Emergency, 
however, ethnic Chinese comprised more than 95 percent of the guerrilla force.10 In June 
1948 the British declared a state of emergency. The Director of Operations, General Sir 
Harold Briggs, implemented what became known as the Briggs Plan, “to clear the 
country step by step, from South to North.” The plan had four objectives: 1) dominate the 
populated areas to build a sense of complete security and increase information from all 
sources, 2) break up the Min Yuen, Chinese peasants sympathetic to the MRLA cause, 
within the populated areas, 3) isolate communist terrorists (CTs) from food and 
                                                 
9 Resources on the Malayan Emergency focus primarily on internal population control measures. The 
conduct of cross-border raids is not widely discussed in historical documents. However, British and 
Australian lessons learned in gathering intelligence against remote communist camps inside and outside 
Malaya during the Emergency are evident in the conflict between Malaya and Indonesia, 1964–1966. In 
this conflict British Special Air Service (SAS) forces played a central role in the successful cross-border 
operations as part of Operation Claret in Borneo. See Raffi Gregorian, “CLARET Operations and 
Confrontation, 1964–1966,” Conflict Quarterly (Winter 1991): 46–72, accessed 14 February 2013, 
http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/download/14933/16002. 
10 John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1954 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 49. 
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intelligence within populated areas, and 4) destroy the CTs by forcing them to attack 
government forces on the government’s terms.11 After Briggs’ retirement in 1951, his 
plan was carried out by General Sir Gerald Templer. Successful population control, 
influence operations, government policies, command and control, and security forces 
adaptation to the operational environment brought an end to active hostilities on 31 July 
1960.12 
 The geography of the Malay Peninsula limits the possibilities for external 
sanctuaries. Thailand in the north was the only external sanctuary for the CT forces. 
Initially, the remote Malayan jungle served as a refuge, but as Malaya was pacified, the 
safe havens in Thailand became crucial to CT survival. Chin Peng hid in Thailand during 
the Emergency and remained there until he signed the final peace accords on 2 December 
1989.13 Influenced by the Americans and the British, Thailand cooperated with Malaya, 
and assisted in operations against CT sanctuaries.14   
B. GOVERNMENT-BACKED CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY 
 Government raids from Malaya into Thailand were conducted by British and 
Australian forces from Malaya with cooperation from the Thai Police. In 1953, the MCP 
leadership, under pressure from the British population resettlement and food control 
measures, relocated to the Thai border region.15 A number of base camps there had been 
completed the year before.16 The population control measures in Malaya were having an 
                                                 
11 Peter Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” in Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military 
Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966, Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (St. Leonards, Australia: 
Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd., 1996), 15. 
12 For Templer’s implementation of Briggs’s plan see Karl Hack, “The Long March to Peace of the 
Malayan Communist Party in Southern Thailand,” in Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on 
the Plural Peninsula, ed. Michael J. Montesano and Patrick Jory (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 173, and 
Hack, “The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3, 
383.     
13 Chin Peng, My Side of History, as told to Ian Ward and Norma Miraflor (Singapore: Media Masters, 
2003), 3. 
14 U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1953–1960: Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), 1954,” accessed 15 February 2013, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953–
1960/SEATO.  
15 Hack, “The Long March to Peace,” 173. 
16 Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs: How Malaya Defeated The Communist Guerrillas 
1948–1960 (London: Cassell, 2004), 189. 
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effect on the CT forces, making the Thai safe havens the MCP’s last bastion. Chin Peng 
intended for MCP units to reside on the southern side of the border just inside Malaya, 
but intelligence reports of British offensive action forced MCP guerrillas into “the deep 
jungle across the border with Siam.”17 There is little mention in the literature of cross-
border operations, but it is clear that extensive planning and resourcing supported such 
operations. For example, Operation Eagle Swoop was a combined Australian/Thai 
operation to destroy a MCP base camp by aerial bombings followed by a ground 
assault.18 
C. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION  
Intelligence operations by the British-led government forces, under the agency 
titled Special Branch, were exceptionally effective in gathering information on CTs 
throughout Malaya.19 However, the Thai/Malayan border was remote, and intelligence 
operations were not as effective as the efforts by Special Branch to implement the Briggs 
plan.20 Some success was gained by Thai/British security force cooperation. In mid-
February 1957, a CT surrendered to Thai police and provided detailed information on a 
CT camp that straddled the border with the bulk of the camp inside Thailand.21 This 
information spurred a combined operation between the Australian 2nd Battalion, the 
Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR) in Malaya and Thai police. A commonwealth force 
of 54 men established a base in northern Malaya on 19 May 1957 to begin reconnoitering 
for the MCP base camp. Their efforts, while unsuccessful, established a precedent for 
cooperation between the British and the Thais.  
                                                 
17 Hack, “The Long March to Peace,” 176. 
18 Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 126. 
19 Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 120. Multiple sources cite numerous examples of 
“exceptionally accurate” Special Branch intelligence operations leading to the capture of CTs and CT 
leadership.  
20 Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 154. Noel Barber in The War of the Running Dogs describes 
Special Branch “as the internal security department dealing with internal subversion, internal revolution 
and counter-espionage,” 191. 
21 Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 126. 
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D. DURATION 
Despite their initial lack of success, British forces continued to enter the area, 
extending the operation for over two months. In the second phase of the operation, 84 
men from the Support Company of 2 RAR were inserted by helicopter two miles north of 
the Thai village of Bukit Perenggan.22 This resulted in a firefight that ultimately led to 
follow-on operations in the area lasting through mid-July. Australian forces continued to 
operate in the area with sporadic enemy contact. (Sources make no mention of Thai 
Police efforts.) In addition to operations by 2 RAR operations, the 1st Battalion, the Royal 
Australian Regiment (1 RAR) conducted small-unit cross-border operations, most lasting 
nearly a month.23 This was in addition to combined operations on the border between 1 
RAR and the Thai Police. 
E. OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE 
 The size of the area traversed by forces during the operation is not clear. It can be 
assumed that the operational area was wider than it was deep, because 2 RAR focused 
inside the southern Thai region, rather than moving deeper north into Thailand. The 
operational range of Thai Police is not recorded apart from descriptions of their daily 
activities in a few remote villages. Approximately 186 Australian troops participated in 
the first phase of Operation Eagle Swoop. The size of the force after 25 June, the start of 
Phase II, is unclear. Additional forces entered the area, including a company headquarters 
(D Company headquarters), at least two platoons (11 and 12 Platoons), and an additional 
company (C Company). It appears the operation involved most of a battalion, 
approximately 400 men.24 The operation included both aerial bombardment and use of a 
field artillery battery, which increased the kinetic signature.  
 Australian operations reports allude to additional small-unit success in cross-
border incursions. In small-scale border interdiction operations, platoon-size or smaller 
                                                 
22 Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 128. 
23 One operation, for example, ran from 10 to 30 June 1960. Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 155. 
24 Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 127–129. 
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elements would cross into Thailand to push guerrillas south into Australian ambushes in 
Malaya.25  
F. BRITISH POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-BORDER 
RAIDS 
 The British government did not initially see the emerging insurgency in Malaya as 
pressing. The lack of British urgency was due in part to the stated objective of the CT 
guerrillas, which was to establish an independent Malayan state. When the hostilities 
began, the British had already begun transitioning Malaya away from colonial rule 
toward independence.26 British newspapers made little mention of the terrorist attacks 
and murders by Chin Peng’s forces in the opening stages of the war.27 It was not until 6 
October 1951, when the CTs ambushed and killed the British High Commissioner to 
Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney, that the British government was galvanized to defeat the 
MCP.28  
 While Gurney’s death helped motivate the British political machine, his earlier 
directives shaped the conduct of the Emergency. Gurney had established two principles: 
1) on no account would the armed forces have control over the conduct of the war, as this 
was a war of political ideologies, and 2) the 600,000 Chinese squatters would be resettled 
and given land rights, which was unprecedented in British colonial rule. The latter policy 
reduced public motivation to support the communists.29 Under these two directives, the 
British received extensive support from the Malayan elites to enact extensive population 
control measures and to carry out offensive military operations. National will among the 
Malays was generally high, and the British continued to cede governing powers to the 
Malay elites over the course of the conflict.30 
                                                 
25 Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 155. 
26 Barber, War of the Running Dogs, 39. 
27 Barber, War of the Running Dogs, 42. 
28 Barber, War of the Running Dogs, 158. 
29 Barber, War of the Running Dogs, 74, and 77–78. 
30 Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 41. 
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 The successful execution of the Briggs Plan, and the subsequent pacification of 
Malaya, helped gain and maintain popular support. From a peak of 8,000 CTs in 1951, 
the MRLA was down to approximately 3,000 fighters in 1955.31 The Emergency ended 
on 31 July 1960. The fight within the borders of Malaya was hailed as a successful 
counterinsurgency. However, a breakdown in the talks between the new Malay 
government and Chin Peng in December 1955 foreshadowed an eventual resurgence of 
the communist rebellion.32 Fortunately for the British, the border region was not a strong 
base of power for the CTs. Stringent bureaucratic arrangements had initially required the 
British to divulge extensive operational details for permission to conduct cross-border 
raids in Thailand. This requirement was in effect for the first year of the conflict, until the 
Malayan-Thai border agreement was signed in September 1949.33 The agreement 
allowed for “hot pursuit” of communists up to eight kilometers across the border and with 
the assistance of a detachment of twelve Thai police officers. The terms were later 
expanded to ten and then 25 kilometers, with an additional agreement that British Royal 
Air Force (RAF) aircraft and Thai Air Force aircraft could fly across the border without 
additional protocols or conditions.  
 The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was an additional political 
mechanism that aided in the conduct of cross-border operations. The purpose of the 
organization was to prevent communism from spreading in Southeast Asia.34 Only two 
Southeast Asian countries were members: Thailand and the Philippines, both close allies 
of the United States. The other members were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. While the tenants of SEATO were not 
directly beneficial to the security of Malaya, it did facilitate cooperation between 
Thailand and British Commonwealth forces. There was some additional negotiating 
                                                 
31 Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 21. 
32 Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 21. 
33 Hack, “The Long March to Peace,” 191.  
34 U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1953–1960: Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), 1954.” 
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between the British and Thai governments in the conduct of cross-border military 
operations during the Malayan Emergency.35 
G. TIMING OF CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO THAILAND 
 The cross-border raids into Thailand occurred during the last two-thirds of the 
conflict, with arguably no direct impact on the conclusion of hostilities. Combined cross-
border operations with British and Thai forces began under General Templer in 1952, 
with cooperative attacks on CT logistical bases in the border region.36 However, border 
operations continued after the Emergency was declared ended. The 1 RAR continued 
border operations for a year after the formal conclusion of hostilities. No correlation 
between the timing of cross-border operations and the outcome of the insurgency is 
evident, excluding the link in 1952 between British attacks on logistical bases along the 
border and Chin Peng’s move to Thailand. 
H. THE TERMINATION OF CROSS-BORDER RAIDS INTO THAILAND 
 Cross-border operations did not come to an abrupt halt; rather, they faded slowly. 
The formal cessation of hostilities in July 1960 established a relative calm in Malaya, 
soon to be called Malaysia. Chin Peng stayed near the border in Thailand for six months 
after the Emergency ended, and remnants of his MCP continued to fight, albeit with 
greatly diminished capabilities and impact.37 Cross-border operations by British and 
Australian forces continued in the region as a result of a subsequent conflict in West 
Malaysia and Borneo.38 Chin Peng’s movement became insignificant, overshadowed by 
events of the 1970s. 
                                                 
35 Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 74. 
36 Barber, War of the Running Dogs, 189. 
37 Hack, “The Long March to Peace,” 181. 
38 See Jeffrey Grey, “Confrontation,” in Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military 
Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966, 167–369. The conflict in Borneo and West Malaysia is 
classified as a state-on-state war. 
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I. SUMMARY 
Operations deep inside Thailand were costly in terms of manpower and time, and 
often lacked tangible results. But when a camp was discovered and successfully attacked, 
the gains were considerable. Almost every kill eliminated a hard-core member of the 
MRLA.39 The cross-border raids had few political costs, because the British leveraged 
extensive external mechanisms to gain the support of neighboring Thailand. The British 
also mitigated the political costs of cross-border operations by implementing an effective 
national counterinsurgency plan that produced positive results. This helped justify the 
attack on guerrilla sanctuaries outside of pacified areas. The use of platoon-sized forces 
produced security gains and reduced the risk of offending Thailand. The British 
effectively used small-unit, cross-border raids into Thailand to complement their robust 
internal counterinsurgency effort. However, internal counterinsurgency methods were 
successful, and intelligence collection along the border region had generally satisfactory 
results. The risk of increasing the frequency of cross-border raids may have increased the 
political costs, without having a corresponding return in security gains, with respect to 
the overall outcome.  
                                                 
39 Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 20. 
 21 
III. NICARAGUA (1981–1990) 
 The Nicaraguan civil war between the Sandinistas and the Contras demonstrates 
the influence of external actors on the outcome of an insurgency. The Soviet Union and 
Cuba almost defeated the American-backed Contras until the United States became more 
steadfast in supporting the Contras. This chapter demonstrates how external actors, 
economic desires, and global conflict can affect cross-border raids.40  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) seized control of Nicaragua 
following the 19 July 1979 ouster of the Somoza regime. Counterrevolutionaries emerged 
almost immediately with the formation of the 15th of September Legion, which joined 
with the Nicaraguan Democratic Union (UDN) to form the Nicaraguan Democratic Force 
(FDN), the primary Contra organization.41 The FDN eventually included the Miskito, an 
indigenous group from the Nicaraguan Atlantic coast that found itself in contention with 
the Sandinista government over land reform.42 In the south, a second major insurgency 
force, the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), operated primarily out of Costa 
Rica.43 The Sandinistas received direct aid from the Soviet Union and equipment and 
military advisors from Cuba, the Soviet surrogate. The United States was the primary 
supplier of aid to the Contras, who kept up insurgent military action against the 
Sandinistas until they were voted out of power. During three phases of the insurgency, 
where momentum shifted back and forth, both sides were influenced by external actors.44  
                                                 
40 Focusing on the period of 1981–1990, English language texts largely take the side of the Contras 
and limit the information available from a Soviet/Sandinista perspective, despite U.S. support for the 
Sandinistas at the time of the ouster of the Somoza regime. 
41 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed 
Counterinsurgency Case Studies (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2010), 67.   
42 Paul, Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies, 67. 
43 Paul, Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies, 68. 
44 Paul, Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies, 67 – 70. The three phases are: Phase I: “Sandinistas 
Must Go” (February 1981 – May 1985) which resulted in a mixed outcome that favored the insurgents 
(Contras), Phase II: “Ortega and Strategic Defeat” (June 1985 – November 1986) which resulted in an 
outcome that favored the COIN force (Sandinistas), and Phase III: “America’s Invisible Hand” (December 
1986 – April 1990) which culminated in a COIN force loss.  
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The allegiances of Nicaragua’s neighbors influenced the political and military 
dynamics. To the south, Costa Rica’s capitalist government was oriented towards the 
United States.45 To the north, Honduras was also under the thumb of the United States, 
which delivered modern combat aircraft to the Honduran government and later positioned 
U.S. ground forces there.46 Thus, the Sandinistas, and consequently the Soviets and 
Cubans, were crammed between two countries that served as sanctuaries for insurgents 
supported by the United States government.  
B. THE DYNAMICS OF SANDINISTA CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND 
SECURITY GAINS 
 The Sandinista military conducted at least three raids per year on Contra 
encampments in Honduras.47 One Honduran source put the number of Nicaraguan cross-
border raids at 300 by early April 1986.48 The Sandinista objectives were to threaten 
Contra base camps, divert Contra forces to the defense of the camps, disrupt Contra 
logistics and infiltration routes, psychologically threaten the Contra leadership, and 
identify Honduras as a sanctuary for the Contras.49  
Raids undertaken later in the conflict were more widely reported by English-
language news media as the United States strove to justify increased aid to its Contra 
surrogates. Of the identifiable cases of cross-border raids, the May 1987 raid received 
little publicity and thus cannot be investigated thoroughly.50 Three cases are presented in 
this chapter. The first is an attack by two Nicaraguan Army battalions, a force of 1,500 
                                                 
45 Nicola Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America 1959–1987 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 11. 
46 Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 200. 
47 James M. McCarl Jr., “Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics” (Master’s thesis, Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, 1990), 120. 
48 James LeMoyne, “Honduran Official Says U.S. Exaggerated Sandinista Raid,” The Day, 03 April 
1986, accessed 12 February 2013, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1915&dat=19860403&id=t9lGAAAAIBAJ&sjid=WfgMAAAAI
BAJ&pg=1322,459411.  
49 McCarl, “Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics,” 120–121. 
50 Bernard E. Trainor, “Anti-Contra Drive: Ill-Fated Shift in Rebel Tactics,” The New York Times, 21 
March 1988, accessed 09 February 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/21/world/anti-contra-drive-ill-
fated-shift-in-rebel-tactics.html.   
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men, on a Contra camp in Honduras on 26 March 1986.51 The camp was reportedly 
twenty miles north of the border, near Nuevo Las Vegas.52 The second case began on 6 
March 1988, with a major Sandinista Army offensive that culminated with Sandinista 
soldiers crossing into Honduras to attack Contra base camps on 23 March.53 In the third 
case, on 13 April 1988, an unknown number of Nicaraguan soldiers destroyed the village 
of Suji in eastern Honduras, killing two and wounding 17.54  
The Sandinista military, under the influence of Cuba and the Soviet Union, relied 
on large formations to conduct cross-border operations. While the presence of Soviet or 
Cuban advisors on cross-border raids is not confirmed, the nature of the advisory 
program and relationship between Havana and Moscow suggest that Cuba’s role was to 
implement Soviet doctrine.55  The main army organizations engaged in tactical 
operations against the Contras were the Batallón de Lucha Cazador (BLCs) and Batallón 
de Lucha Irregular (BLIs).56 The BLCs focused on specific geographical areas, while the 
BLIs maintained national counterinsurgency responsibility, operating throughout the 
center of Nicaragua between the Honduran and Costa Rican borders. The emphasis on 
battalion-sized operations came from Soviet counterinsurgency tactics in Afghanistan 
designed to surround and destroy guerrilla forces deep within insurgent strongholds.57  
                                                 
51 “White House Says Action Responds to Troop Buildup,” The Miami News Express Edition, 26 
March 1986, accessed 08 February 2013, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid= 
71XFh8zZwT8C&dat=19860326&printsec=frontpage&hl=en   
52 Ellen Hampton and Julia Malone, “Sandinista Raid Helps Contra Aid Chance In Senate,” The 
Miami News, 26 March 1986, 4a, accessed 08 February 2013, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2206&dat=19860326&id=FXNYAAAAIBAJ&sjid=Qj0NAAAA
IBAJ&pg=1846,7407178 
53 Marjorie Miller, “Sandinistas Raid Honduras Again, Contras Say,” Los Angeles Times, 24 March 
1988, accessed 08 February 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/1988–03–24/news/mn-361_1_sandinista-
troops, and Gordon L. Bowen, “Foundations of U.S. Policies: The Contras Campaign Against Sandinista 
Nicaragua,” accessed 08 February 2013, http://www.mbc.edu/faculty/gbowen/contras.htm. 
54 “Honduras Says Sandinistas Destroyed A Village, Killing 2,” The New York Times, 25 April 1988, 
accessed 08 February 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/25/world/honduras-says-sandinistas-
destroyed-a-village-killing-2.html  
55 McCarl, “Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics,” 106. According to Francis McNeill, former U.S. 
Ambassador to Costa Rica, there were believed to be 800 to 1,200 Cuban military and security advisors in 
Nicaragua, a large difference in the reported 3,000 Cuban advisors that were claimed by the U.S. State 
Department; McCarl, 48. 
56 McCarl, “Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics,” 96. 
57 McCarl, “Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics,” 104. 
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 The Sandinistas’ large counterinsurgent cross-border operations made self-
defense arguments implausible; it was difficult to mitigate second and third order post-
raid effects. The BLI was designed to attack Contra forces of 200 men or more, and the 
BLC would use an entire battalion in attacks on Contra forces larger than forty men.58 
Such large cross-border operations have extensive planning and logistical requirements. 
For example, in the March 1988 offensive, large numbers of Nicaraguan troops and 
supply convoys established a command post 30 miles from the Honduran/Nicaraguan 
border in the mining town of Bonanza.59 This single operation involved upwards of 4,500 
soldiers, while the incursion on 26 March involved only 1,500. With six battalions 
involved in cross-border attacks, it was difficult for the Sandinista government to 
downplay its violation of a sovereign border.  
 The Nicaraguan Forces had good intelligence for their cross-border attacks. The 
March 1988 offensive was successful because the Contra insurgents, after moving from 
Yamales to the San Adres de Bocay area at the request of the Honduran government, 
stagnated for over a year.60 Although the terrain was challenging and the Contra base 
camps were dispersed, the Nicaraguan forces conducted effective attacks against several 
logistical bases and medical facilities, and took control of a dirt airstrip.61 However, the 
Sandinistas were not able to kill or capture the Contras head, Enrique Bermudez, who 
was in the border region with his staff.62 
 The Nicaraguan Army effectively disrupted Contra activities in Honduras with its 
large-scale cross-border raids. The May 1987 raid into the Bocay River valley destroyed 
weapons, ammunition and food, and denied the Contras a safe haven. This raid was 
critical because supplies had become more valuable with the waning of U.S. aid.  
                                                 
58 McCarl, “Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics,” 106 and 114. 
59 Bernard E. Trainor, “Anti-Contra Drive: Ill-Fated Shift in Rebel Tactics,” The New York Times, 21 
March 1988, accessed 09 February 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/21/world/anti-contra-drive-ill-
fated-shift-in-rebel-tactics.html.   
60 Bernard E. Trainor, “Anti-Contra Drive: Ill-Fated Shift in Rebel Tactics,” The New York Times, 21 
March 1988, accessed 09 February 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/21/world/anti-contra-drive-ill-
fated-shift-in-rebel-tactics.html 
61 McCarl, “Sandinista Counterinsurgancy Tactics,” 121. 
62 James M. McCarl Jr., “Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics” (Master’s thesis, Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, 1990), 74. 
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Honduran reactions to the cross-border raids were mixed. Prior to the large 
Sandinista offensive in March 1988, Honduras did not perceive the raids as a direct threat 
to their government. After the U.S. stepped up its aid, it appears that the Hondurans were 
bought by U.S. money and military support. American resolve was tested when the 
Hondurans pressed for military action against Nicaragua utilizing U.S. war material.63  
 The size of the operational area where Nicaragua conducted cross-border raids is 
largely irrelevant in light of the political environment. By design, the BLIs could move 
from one area to the next without any impact on the scope of the war. However, increased 
use of BLIs did require increased use of BLCs in offensive operations. In fact, the 
expansion of the Nicaraguan military was a response to the perceived military threat from 
the United States, not because of stepped-up operations in the border regions.64 The 
March 1988 cross-border raids triggered a U.S. response that included support from the 
U.S. Senate in the form of increased aid and the deployment of 3,200 U.S. soldiers—an 
indication of the high political cost of the cross-border engagements.65 
C. THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND POLITICAL COSTS 
The Nicaraguan communist party was formed in 1939.66 From 1941 to 1947, 
Soviet Russia instructed Latin American regional communist movements to support 
Allied war efforts, but this ended with the conclusion of World War II and the onset of 
the Cold War.67 At the time, Soviet objectives in Latin America were “to strengthen 
Soviet influence wherever possible, to defend ‘Socialist’ Cuba, and to weaken the still 
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predominant position of the United States.”68 Until the mid-1980s, the Soviets viewed 
the region as lacking “objective” and “subjective” conditions for a Communist victory; 
they anticipated that more progressive Socialist movements were needed to prepare the 
political and economic base for Socialist reconstruction.69  
Entrenched U.S. socio-political and economic dominance in Latin America 
constrained Soviet efforts to project power and consolidate a strong economic presence.70 
After Gorbachev’s ascension to Communist Party leadership in 1985, the Soviets focused 
on establishing a visible economic presence in Latin America.71 They began to look more 
closely at creating ties within Latin America to further the Soviet socialist movement.  
The Soviets were guardedly reserved in committing their political will, sharing 
information, and sending forces to support the Nicaraguan campaign against the Contras. 
The communist revolutionary movement had suffered three defeats in Latin America—in 
El Salvador in 1932, Costa Rica in 1948, and Guatemala in 1954. Soviet analysts, 
anticipating U.S. intervention after the 1979 Nicaraguan revolution, had doubts about the 
insurgency’s prospects.72 In Nicaragua, as in El Salvador, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR or Soviet Union) “was reluctant to involve itself in the affairs of a 
Third World country in which the USSR had no security concerns and which was rapidly 
becoming the focus of U.S. definitions of its own national interest.”73  In 1980 and 1981, 
with the Carter administration’s indecisive response to events in Nicaragua and the 
Sandinista’s efficient consolidation of power, Soviet optimism increased.74 Putting aside 
their reservations, the Soviets made an economic pact to supply arms to the Sandinista 
government. The Nicaraguans agreed to the pact with the Soviets only because they had 
exhausted virtually every other means of obtaining weapons.75   
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The cross-border raids by Sandinista forces resulted in increased U.S. monetary 
aid to the Contras and the positioning of U.S. forces in Honduras. With the U.S. exerting 
increased pressure in the region, the Soviets, by way of their proxy Cuba, had little 
interest in continuing to support the Sandinista government. The Soviets’ initial belief 
that they stood to gain only limited strategic and political gains from the Sandinistas was 
correct.76 Economically, the Soviets saw little compatibility between the Soviet and 
Nicaraguan economies.77 Most importantly, the USSR saw little advantage in defending 
Nicaragua compared with the value of their relationship with Cuba, which is strategically 
located inside U.S. shipping lanes.78  
D. THE OVERALL TIMING OF NICARAGUAN CROSS-BORDER 
OFFENSIVES 
 The timing of Nicaraguan cross-border raids was more relevant to political events 
than to force attrition. The March 1988 incursion into Honduras provoked a clear U.S. 
response and put the Managua-based politicians in check. The timing of the raids 
hastened the end of the conflict because cross-border raids triggered extensive political 
pressure that constrained the Sandinistas’ fighting ability. The Soviet Union, instead of 
countering U.S. presence, used the controversy as an opportunity to exit Nicaragua, 
separate itself from the crumbling economic situation in Latin America, and focus on its 
war in Afghanistan.79  
E. THE TERMINATION OF NICARAGUAN CROSS-BORDER RAIDS 
 The Nicaraguan military halted cross-border raids because their limited security 
gains did not justify the high political cost. Of their five objectives, the Sandinistas 
accomplished three. They attacked and threatened Contra base camps, disrupted Contra 
logistics and infiltration routes, and identified Honduras as a Contra sanctuary.  
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The movement of the Contra base camp complex from Yamales to Bocay is 
evidence of how the Nicaraguan attacks threatened Contra logistics bases. But the 
disruption to Contra logistics often came at a hefty price. Sandinista military elements 
faced fierce resistance and heavy casualties. Their raids provoked Honduran military 
retaliation against targets inside Nicaragua. The March 1986 raid against El Paraiso by 
1,500 to 2,000 Sandinista soldiers resulted in 300 and 400 casualties from a counterattack 
by Contras returning to Honduras from an operation in Nicaragua.80 The December 1986 
Sandinista raid on the Contras at the Las Vegas salient involved approximately 1,000 
soldiers and provoked Honduran Air Force attacks on military targets inside Nicaragua.81  
The identification of Honduras as a Contra refuge undermined Nicaraguan efforts. 
When the Nicaraguans developed the area for military operations, the United States 
stepped up its anti-Sandinista rhetoric. Ultimately, the Sandinistas’ security gains were 
overshadowed by the political costs: the external pressure that United States exerted 
through Honduras, the threat of American military involvement, and the wavering 
commitment of the Soviets.  
F. SUMMARY 
The Soviet and Cuban-backed Sandinista government’s poor application of cross-
border raids into Honduras adversely affected their counterinsurgency against the U.S.-
supported Contras. Large troop movements, long logistical lines, and limited success of 
cross-border raids generated few security gains at significant political cost. The scale of 
Sandinista cross-border raids, rather than their frequency, is the flaw in the campaign 
plan. Soviet ambivalence and U.S. determination meant the Nicaraguan government 
could not reduce the political cost of their raids, and the Sandinistas eventually ended all 
cross-border operations. Less dramatic and intensive use of Sandinista military force was 
inconsistent with Soviet doctrine, but a more temperate approach would have entailed 
fewer political costs.  
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IV. ALGERIAN INDEPENDENCE (1954–1962) 
 The Algerian War of Independence is the null case in this study. This chapter 
examines two cross-border military raids. Neither involved ground troops and thus, both 
operations fall outside the focus of this thesis. However, because ground assault options 
were considered but deemed too costly, the raids discussed in this chapter provide 
important lessons for the security gain/political cost paradigm.82  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 The Algerian War of Independence began in November 1954 when members of 
the newly formed Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) conducted attacks across Algeria 
against government buildings, police stations, and farms.83 The FLN was the primary 
political wing of the insurgents. Its military wing, the Armée de Libération Nationale 
(ALN), conducted kinetic operations against French interests. The ALN seized arms and 
ammunition from the French until logistical support was firmly established in 
neighboring Tunisia and Morocco, which took place after the French ended their 
occupation of the two countries 1956.84 By 1958 the insurgents had largely lost the 
military struggle, and with the French Challe offensive of 1959, the ALN was almost 
finished as a significant military force.85 However, following the Evian Agreements in 
March 1962, the rebels achieved the ultimate victory, Algerian independence, on 3 July 
1962. The rebels secured diplomatic and political advantage by sowing doubt in the 
minds of the war-weary French people and the fragmented French government.86  
 The neighboring countries of Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Libya provided 
important external support and sanctuary to the FLN forces. By the end of the war, 
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Tunisia was home to 31 different FLN bases and training centers, including, at one point, 
a garrison of about thirty thousand ALN fighters. Morocco sheltered 40 smaller FLN 
bases.87 Small camps and logistical hubs were present in Egypt and Libya, but most of 
these camps were rendered insignificant by French naval interdiction operations that 
forced logistics through Tunisia and Morocco.88 The French also denied the Sahara 
Desert as a viable infiltration route through the use of ground-based radar systems.89  
B. FRENCH ATTEMPTS AT ISOLATION 
 After the war in Indochina and the nationalist uprisings in Tunisia and Morocco, 
the French knew that isolating rebels from the population was the only way to win the 
war in Algeria.90  Because military material support to the ALN could only come from 
abroad, the French decided to seal the Algerian borders.91 The Morice Line was a 
formidable barrier of wire, mines and electronics. Completed in 1957, it ran from the 
Mediterranean Sea to the Sahara Desert along the Tunisian border.92 The Tunisian border 
fence ran 450 kilometers, while a second fence along the Moroccan border totaled 750 
kilometers in length.93 The fence network managed to interdict 95 percent of all 
infiltrations by ALN forces into Algeria.94 Together the Morice Line and the Challe plan, 
which stationed garrisons of static security forces in Algerian towns, would have broken 
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the Algerian insurgency if not for the political upheaval created by the FLN in Algeria 
and France.95 
C. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION, DURATION, OPERATIONAL 
AREA AND FORCE SIZE IN THE FRENCH-ALGERIAN PARADIGM 
 In the middle of 1958, French military capability peaked at around 400,000 men, 
later stabilizing to approximately 380,000.96 With as many as 80,000 soldiers deployed 
along the Morice Line, the monetary and material cost of defending 1200 kilometers 
proved unsustainable.97 The economic crisis in France limited funds for the war effort, 
and the Morice Line required constant reinforcement and repair.98 After seven months, 
the Morice Line was abandoned. However, the effort had damaged the FLN, rendering 
them tactically ineffective. French information management was largely successful, 
vindicating the efforts of the French security forces.99 
 However, two French cross-border operations had catastrophic impact on the 
French war effort. The first was the October 1956 French diversion of the Morocco-
bound aircraft bearing FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella and five FLN operatives. The 
diversion resulted in their capture. Because Ben Bella’s popularity was waning within the 
FLN ranks, the political ramifications of his capture were greater than the operational-
level impact.100 The second operation was the French bombing of the Tunisian city of 
Sakiet on 8 February 1958.101 The FLN exploited public opinion against the collateral 
damage to civilian infrastructure, effectively thwarting France’s chance for a peaceful 
compromise with the FLN and Tunisian leadership.102  
For the purpose of this thesis, these cases highlight the value of strong intelligence 
(albeit with bad indiscriminate execution in the case of Sakiet), short duration, narrow 
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operational areas, and carefully tailored force sizes. In both cases, the French paid high 
political costs, suffering substantial negative international and domestic consequences.103 
The rebels, recognizing the impact of information operations, exploited French atrocities 
and created great psychological impacts in France and elsewhere by terrorist acts in 
Algiers and other major cities.104 
D. FRENCH POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-BORDER 
RAIDS 
Both the metropolitan French and the ethnic French pieds noirs saw Algeria, 
unlike Tunisia and Morocco, as sovereign French territory.105 By granting independence 
to Tunisia and Morocco, thus lessening their burden in North Africa, the French 
concentrated on keeping Algeria.106 The formal independence agreements between 
France and the states of Tunisia and Morocco specified the protection of French persons 
and property and continued French economic, military and cultural influence. Within 
month, the agreements rang hollow, as both nations lent support to the FLN.107 
The French capture of Ben Bella resulted in further attacks against French settlers 
and earned the scorn of Muhammed V of Morocco, who had hosted the FLN leaders.108 
Rather than obstruct the political progress toward independence in Morocco and Tunisia, 
or attack into them, the French chose to isolate Algeria with a sophisticated fence. French 
military leaders began to resent the government when their tactical urgency was impeded 
by economic uncertainty and political indecision in France.109 The infighting and plotting 
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within the French government and military came to a head with the Sakiet raid.110 The 
Sakiet raid proved so unpopular that it caused the ouster of the Gaillard government.111 
E. STRATEGIC-LEVEL INFORMATION 
 While the Ben Bella incident was politically costly, the Sakiet raid brought 
international pressure to the forefront. The civilian casualties allowed the Tunisian 
president, Habib Bourguiba, to order the immediate evacuation of French forces. The raid 
also justified charges of French “aggression” at the United Nations’ Security Council.112 
Frances’ failure to properly disseminate information to the world audience allowed the 
FLN to change the narrative of the attack. The French had attacked after several filing 
several formal protests with the Tunisian government; the attack was consistent with the 
military’s 1957 standing orders.113 French mismanagement of information is also 
exemplified by their slowness in reporting that 90 percent of the village was still intact 
while 80 percent of guerrilla targets were destroyed and 100 rebels killed.114 Instead 
French intelligence called the outcome of the raid “incalculable.”115   
F. DURATION AND FORCE SIZE 
 In Sakiet, force size was an issue; the duration of the operation was not. The 
French bombardment of Sakiet involved 25 planes—eleven B26 bombers, six Corsair 
fighter-bombers, and eight Mistral fighters.116 The use of these weapons was justifiable, 
but the images publicized by the FLN invited doubt and international condemnation, 
including pressure from the United States, which saw the use of American military 
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equipment in such an attack as egregious.117 It was argued that one plane could have 
destroyed the antiaircraft installation. Gaillard was immediately forced to cover for the 
army, even though the operation was conducted within the scope of the government’s 
orders.118 Ironically, an air attack was chosen over a ground raid for fear a ground assault 
would look like an invasion of Tunisia and produce too many casualties.119 
G. NATIONAL WILL 
 Sakiet became a symbol counter to its original intent. It fatally harmed the French 
cause. Chaos in Paris after the attack revealed the dysfunctions of the French 
government.120  France was already strained by poor economics, a string of costly and 
bloody conflicts, and political infighting. There was so much turmoil in France that at one 
point there was a threat to drop paratroopers on Paris to install Charles de Gaulle’s 
Republican government.121 The Sakiet raid was the downfall of the Gaillard government. 
De Gaulle took the helm of the French government on 1 June 1958 by a vote of 329 to 
224.122  Amid widespread disenchantment with the government, de Gaulle was seen as 
the one person who could save France from civil war, unite the population, and deliver a 
tangible solution to the problem of Algeria.123  
H. THE TIMING OF FRENCH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS 
 The timing of the Sakiet raid had extensive repercussions politically but 
negligible effects operationally. The Sakiet raid had limited tactical benefit and 
catastrophic political implications for the French because of the political discourse 
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underway in France and the placidity with which the French handled the young Tunisian 
and Moroccan governments. In effect, the timing of the raid was more important in the 
political realm than in the context of insurgency and counterinsurgency. This shows that 
cross-border raids can have dramatic political repercussions, and that such effects are not 
necessarily insurmountable. De Gaulle, through General Maurice Challe, gained military 
victory by 1960. The French were ultimately defeated by the Algerian vote for 
independence in 1962.124  
I. SUMMARY  
 The French withdrawal from Algeria cannot be pinned on a single pivotal event, 
the bombing of Sakiet, although Sakiet exemplifies the FLN’s proficiency in exploiting 
French atrocities and the upheaval within the French government during the conflict. The 
Sakiet raid relied on aircraft because the use of ground forces was deemed too costly. The 
French use of the Morice Line had mixed results. It was very effective at cutting off 
external support to the FLN, but it was costly to maintain and demoralizing to the soldiers 
stationed on the fortifications.125 Political infighting did little to help legitimize France’s 
intentions to the world audience. Had the French government been less divided, more 
attuned to its military forces, and more committed to military directives and information 
management, external sanctuaries within Tunisia and Morocco might have been attacked 
with fewer political consequences.  
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Figure 5.  Map of Algeria Showing Border Fortifications126 
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V. NAMIBIA (1960–1989) 
 The insurgency in Namibia (formerly known as South-West Africa) shows how 
cross-border operations can spiral out of control. Because it failed to respect human rights 
standards, South Africa, the colonial ruler of South-West Africa, came under intense 
scrutiny by human rights advocates for its raids outside of Namibia. In addition, Soviet 
and Cuban support to neighboring countries, specifically Angola, greatly increased the 
political costs associated with large-scale cross-border operations. This case demonstrates 
when a large cross-border clash is enmeshed with communist expansionism and human 
rights violations. The case also involves an ineffective and questionable Namibian 
counterinsurgency model designed to maintain white dominance in the government and 
the region.  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 South Africa asserted colonial rule over Namibia following Germany’s defeat in 
World War I. In 1960, the future Namibian people formed the South West Africa 
People’s Organization (SWAPO) to counter racially discriminatory South African 
policies. This was followed by the formation of SWAPO’s armed wing, the People’s 
Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) in 1966.127 For almost 30 years, South Africa 
controlled security inside Namibia as well as cross-border operations in nine regional 
states. This chapter discusses cross-border incursions directly related to the insurrection 
in Namibia.128 
In July 1988, the Angolan, Cuban and South African governments announced an 
agreement to establish peace in southwestern Africa.129 The Namibia-Angola Peace 
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Accord was formally accepted on 23 November. It was dependent upon the withdrawal of 
Cuban forces from Angola and South African forces from Namibia.130 
 At the time, the political environment in the south of Africa was characterized by 
conflict and mixed allegiances. Namibia was governed by South Africa under a post- 
World War I mandate for ex-German territories.131 There were South African Police 
(SAP) operations in Rhodesia and surrogate-force campaigns in Angola, Mozambique, 
Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.132 Angola was of central importance to the political 
environment. The South African Defense Force (SADF) was conducting cross-border 
operations against SWAPO elements and waging a covert war against the Cuban-backed 
Angolan government by supplying arms to guerrillas from the União Nacional para a 
Independência Total de Angola (the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola, UNITA).133 Angola, and all the military and political dealings therein, proved 
pivotal to the cessation of fighting in Namibia. 
B. GOVERNMENT-BACKED CROSS BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY 
P.W. Botha’s election as South Africa’s Prime Minister in 1978 ushered in an era 
of aggressive South African cross-border operations in southern Angola.134  Botha’s war 
strategy evolved over the next four years in response to growing SWAPO military 
capabilities, a buildup of Angolan heavy weapons in southern Angola, and the changing 
political environment in Namibia and in the United States.135 The objectives of the Botha 
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strategy were to destroy SWAPO as a credible military force, and to demonstrate South 
Africa’s resolve in the face of armed insurgency and its determination avoid political 
concessions forced by military weakness.136 This flexible strategy was later summarized 
by the South African Minister of Defense, General Magnus Malan, in an address to 
Parliament on 4 February 1986. 
 
The security forces will hammer them, wherever they find them.  
What I am saying is the policy of the government. We will not sit  
here with hands folded waiting for them to cross the borders… we 
shall settle the hash of those terrorists, their fellow-travelers and  
those who help them.137 
 
Following Botha’s proclamation, SADF began cross-border raids that gradually 
increased in frequency and scope. The first raid was in May 1978; it lasted one or two 
days and destroyed a SWAPO camp.138 This was followed by joint SADF air and ground 
operations in Angola and Zambia. By 1982, South Africa’s cross-border raids were 
paying off, although SWAPO remained a threat.139 The South African raids meant 
SWAPO could not establish permanent bases in southern Angola. The raids complicated 
SWAPO’s logistical and recruiting operations; SWAPO lost large quantities of arms and 
equipment and suffered several hundred casualties annually. Most importantly, the raids 
weakened SWAPO’s negotiating position.140  
C. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION 
 South African intelligence collection on suspected SWAPO sanctuaries must be 
categorized as good to excellent. While no direct link can be established between any 
particular SADF organization and any given cross-border raid, the fact that SADF 
controlled a large portion of southern Angola gave them a direct hand in intelligence 
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collection, including access to South African-backed UNITA fighters.141 The regular 
conduct of operations within southern Angola and high-level South African support 
indicate the magnitude of cross-border intelligence collection efforts. The United States’ 
covert support of South Africa’s Operation Savannah in 1975, three years before 
unilateral SADF operations began in earnest, also relied on the systematic development 
of intelligence to support operations.142 
D. DURATION 
 As the success of SADF cross-border raids became routine, the duration of the 
operations increased. The very short May 1978 raid eventually led to the near-complete 
occupation of southern Angola following Botha’s 1988 edict that South African troops 
would remain in Angola until the Cubans left.143 The occupation was essentially a 
continuation of thirteen years of SADF operations originating from southern Angola.144 
E. OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE 
 SADF cross-border operations were so strong that almost no type of unit, size, or 
depth of target was off the table. In August 1981, SADF launched Operation Protea, the 
largest South African mechanized military operation since World War II.145 At the height 
of Operation Protea, SADF occupied 50,000 square kilometers of Angola’s Cunene 
province. The SADF attacks extended 175 miles north of the Namibia-Angola border 
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without serious threat of retaliation.146  In May 1978, SADF attacked a camp at Cassinga 
within fifteen kilometers of Cuban and Angolan forces with no detectable military 
response.147 South Africa’s military superiority gave it nearly unfettered access to large 
portions of Angola until June 1988, when the military dynamic shifted after a South 
African attack near the Namibian border was met by an Angolan counter-attack at the 
Caleque Dam.148  
F. SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-
BORDER RAIDS 
 The South African government framed the need for military action in Namibia, 
and subsequently into Angola, as part of the West’s resistance to the spread of Soviet 
communism.149 However, the war was perceived as a domestic one with international 
features; it was in fact a confrontation between Black Africa (non-whites) and the South 
African apartheid policy of white dominance.150 Had the South Africa government fully 
embraced the concepts of the internationally accepted Turnhalle Initiative and held 
elections in 1978, SWAPO’s initiative for independence might well have been 
preempted.151 This would have been similar to the British government’s actions during 
the Malayan Emergency. However, the militant stance of the Botha government 
destroyed the chances of an internationally acceptable agreement to insure black Africans 
equality and a meaningful role in the political system. 
G. STRATEGIC-LEVEL INFORMATION 
 South Africa’s high political costs were a result of destructive aspects of SADF 
operations and their extensive use of cross-border raids under broad government 
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directives. The May 1978 SADF attack against the camp of Cassinga as part of Operation 
Reindeer effectively disrupted SWAPO military operations but also had a devastating 
effect on South Africa’s international relationships. Mistreatment and misidentification of 
civilians on the battlefield were cited as direct violations of the laws of war.152 South 
African anxiety about external reactions to the raid is revealed by the situation reports 
requested by the SADF leadership. A request at 1930 hours for reports on civilian 
casualties is followed at 2050 hours by an inquiry whether any Cubans had been 
captured.153 The gross neglect of human rights by SADF reflects directly on the high-
level South African officials who approved the operation despite knowing there would be 
civilians on the battlefield. Diplomatic efforts to justify the South African cause rang 
hollow to the international community. 
H. DURATION AND FORCE SIZE 
 In Namibia, the duration and force size of SADF operations correlates with the 
political cost to South Africa. South African soldiers’ freedom of movement in early 
cross-border attacks was essentially unchallenged by Angolan and Cuban forces. The 
Cuban position on South African cross-border operations was basically defensive. When 
SADF operations intensified in 1985, the Angolan government became increasingly 
concerned for its own survival and requested more military aid from Cuba and the Soviet 
Union.154 The Angolan military capacity and competence increased. When Angola also 
acquired Soviet MiG 23s, the SADF was forced to shift from a purely offensive strategy 
to a more defensive one.155 The Soviet-bloc response led to active military engagements 
between SADF and Cuban forces in Angola. Military confrontations between the SADF 
and the Cubans culminated in the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola in 
1988. 
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I. NATIONAL WILL 
 The South African will to fight in Namibia weakened when SADF was pushed 
south of the Namibian border in 1988. The loss of military superiority helped force South 
Africa to the negotiating table. The South Africans had a strong desire to see Cuban 
withdrawal from Angola so they could reestablish military superiority over Angola.156 At 
the same time, continued United Nations condemnation of South African operations in 
Namibia and Angola led to devastating international sanctions and increased South 
African war costs. The SADF activities in southern Angola were accompanied by South 
Africa’s unsuccessful efforts to install a new government in Namibia. South African 
leaders hoped to maintain the white-led government and to dominate the external political 
actors active in the region.157 Meanwhile, increasing numbers of South African English 
and Afrikaan youth joined anti-war protests and refused to enter conscripted service. The 
combined reactions of international, Namibian, and domestic elements put the South 
African leadership in a political stranglehold.158 
J. THE TIMING AND TERMINATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN CROSS-
BORDER RAIDS IN NAMIBIA 
  The timing of the South African cross-border raids was insignificant compared to 
their duration. The cross-border campaign turned into a thirteen-year occupation of 
southern Angola. Although the cross-border raids resulted in significant security gains, 
the benefits were overshadowed by the intensity of SADF conduct against SWAPO and 
Angolan military sites and the SADF human rights atrocities. The Cuban/Angolan 
response to continued violations of sovereignty (long duration) were another important 
factor in ending the conflict. The prolonged cross-border operations and the disposition 
of Cuban and South African forces resulted in the Namibia-Angola Peace Accord.159 
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K.  SUMMARY 
 The South African government’s willingness to absorb the political costs of the 
cross-border operations in 1978 resulted in a rigid stance that led to the prolonged 
occupation of southern Angola and the intimidation of Cuban and Angolan leaders. The 
SADF military operations in southern Angola were so forceful and prolonged that they 
provoked international pressure to end the conflict. The South African government 
eventually combined its counter-insurgency campaign in Namibia with a counter-
communist strategy in Angola. Even though the Cubans withdrew from Angola, the 
SADF had to abandon Namibia. Regardless of the military outcome, the white South 
African government was bound for failure due to international sanctions imposed because 
of its domestic apartheid policies. 
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VI. SOUTH VIETNAM (1960–1975) 
 The U.S. involvement in Vietnam was a limited conventional war. However, the 
United States also waged a covert war in Laos and Cambodia. In Cambodia, this briefly 
became an overt battle involving thousands of U.S. soldiers. This case study illustrates 
both overt and covert strategies against external enemy sanctuaries. The covert campaign 
in Laos and Cambodia was so broad that capturing all but the major points is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. The same can be said for the overt Cambodian campaign, but the 
overt operation there is more easily researched. These two campaigns exemplify different 
military and political methodologies applied to the same war and the same political 
context.  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 American involvement in Vietnam begins near the end of World War II. The 
French began battling an insurgency in their colony of Indochina in 1946, but were 
defeated by the communists at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.160 The subsequent 1954 Geneva 
agreement was seen by the U.S. as conducive to communist exploitation in Southeast 
Asia.161 Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) was formed in February 1962. 
In February 1965, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson committed armed forces to South 
Vietnam in order to defend it from North Vietnamese communist aggression.162 The war 
escalated through the April 1968 high-water mark of 549,500 American combat 
personnel in Vietnam.163 American troops began drawing down the following year and 
completed withdrawal in January 1973. The war between the North and the South did not 
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end until April 1975, when the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) defeated the Republic 
of Vietnam forces.164 
 In January 1950, the French government established Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia as autonomous “associated states” within the French Union.165 Shortly 
thereafter, the United States recognized the Laotian and Cambodian governments so it 
could increase direct military and economic assistance to stem the spread of communism 
after the fall of China.166 The flow of PAVN supplies to South Vietnam via the Truon 
Son Route, better known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, demonstrates the porousness of the 
borders and the loyalties of the neighboring countries of Laos and Cambodia.167 The Ho 
Chi Minh Trail was costly for the North Vietnamese forces, however, as it required 
protection and maintenance by 50,000 North Vietnamese troops and100,000 laborers.168    
The 1952 Geneva Accords had established Laotian neutrality. However, the 
United States soon created a multibillion-dollar program to aid the Laotian government; 
the aid increased throughout the conflict in Vietnam.169 Even so, by late 1960, Laotian 
policy makers were meeting with Soviet officials to seek assistance in lieu of American 
support.170  
In Cambodia, the Sihanouk government announced in March 1968 that due to 
American aggression, Cambodia would support the logistical needs of the North 
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Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong.171 When Sihanouk went abroad for medical 
treatment, he was stripped of his governmental powers. Cambodia demanded that Hanoi 
immediately remove NVA and VC forces from its territory, triggering the conflict 
between General Lon Nol’s pro-U.S. regime and the North Vietnamese-backed Khmer 
Rouge.172 In short, as the American government tried to influence events and thwart 
communism through various kinds of assistance and a full-scale war in Vietnam, the 
allegiances of Laos and Cambodia ebbed and flowed.173  
B. AMERICAN CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY 
 American cross-border raids into Laos were surreptitious, while the raids into 
Cambodia led to full-scale operations by conventional ground forces. Operations Plan 
34A, commonly known as OPLAN 34A, was approved by President Johnson in January 
1964 and put into motion with the signing of General Order 6, which created the Studies 
and Observation Group (SOG, MACSOG, or MACVSOG) within the MACV 
architecture.174 Based on the poor performance of indigenous tribal spotters the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had recruited in Laos, supplementing native people 
with U.S. military personnel was deemed critical for interdiction along the Ho Chi Minh 
trail.175  
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Early attempts at cross-border reconnaissance and raids taught the U.S. two 
lessons. The first is reflected in project DELTA, which fielded combined American and 
South Vietnamese Special Forces for long-range reconnaissance operations within South 
Vietnam. In addition, early experiences convinced American military officials that 
successful covert cross-border operations required direct U.S. military participation.176 
OP 35’s primary mission was to identify enemy targets in order to call in air strikes, but 
U.S. military leaders soon found that these units could also conduct direct-action 
operations, capture prisoners, plant mines and electronic sensing equipment, and conduct 
battle damage assessments (BDA) as a result of U.S. bombing strikes.177 Leaders hoped 
that the covert operations would convince the North Vietnamese to reconsider their 
conflict in South Vietnam and their violation of Laotian neutrality.178  
MACVSOG/OP 35 operations in Laos began in 1966 under the name SHINING 
BRASS.179 The continued operations required considerable effort from the Royal Lao 
Army and Air Force, the Hmong army, the Thai volunteers, U.S. Army and Air Force 
advisors, and CIA operatives (including Air America, and Bird and Sons).180 OP 35 
missions averaged eleven patrols per month in 1966, twenty five per month in 1968, and 
peaked at over thirty seven patrols per month in 1969.181 The utility of these operations is 
seen in BDA estimates. In 1969, OP 35 operations resulted in 1016 air strikes, the 
destruction of 161 structures through direct action, and the death of 718 PAVN soldiers. 
OP 35 operations forced the NVA to deploy an additional 25,000 men to secure the 
trail.182 In one week during 1971, OP 35 teams working with AC-130 gunships 
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temporarily halted all traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, effectively producing as much 
impact as two U.S. infantry battalions.183  
Although OP 35 operations achieved tactical successes, they never seriously 
impeded the movement of NVA/VC logistics. It is estimated that the NVA needed only 
15 to 60 tons of supplies to support their soldiers in the field—the equivalent, and easily 
attained goal, of 15 to 60 trucks a day.184 In April 1972, MACVSOG was shuttered and 
operations in Laos ceased with President Nixon’s Vietnamization policy designed to 
phase in autonomy for the South Vietnamese military and allow U.S. withdrawal.185  
 The Cambodian incursion began in May 1970. It involved one area called the 
Fishhook and another west of Saigon known as the Angel’s Wing or Parrot’s Beak.186  
The first cross-border attacks by conventional U.S. forces, Operation Rock Crusher, were 
a combined U.S.-Republic of Vietnam Army (ARVN) mission.187 The U.S. Army’s III 
Corps committed four cavalry squadrons, the 46th Infantry Regiment, and the 25th 
Infantry Division for reorganization into three infantry-armor task forces.188 In May and 
June 1970, American casualties in the Cambodian campaign were 284 killed in action, 
2,339 wounded in action, and 13 missing in action, on top of the 800 killed and 3,410 
wounded ARVN soldiers.189  
Damage to the NVA/VC war apparatus in Cambodia was not as great as 
anticipated due to two factors. First, entire NVA/VC regiments had moved west from the 
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border to attack the Royal Cambodian Army. Second, it appears that NVA/VC units 
anticipated the incursion and were evacuated.190 Nonetheless, Operation Rock Crusher 
resulted in the killing of 11,349 enemy fighters, the capture of 2,328 NVA/VC personnel, 
and the destruction of hundreds of tons of supplies.191  The impact of Operation Rock 
Crusher continued after American and South Vietnamese forces withdrew from 
Cambodia. The NVA and VC were psychologically traumatized by the destruction of 
their sanctuary and were demoralized by the loss of war fighting materials entering from 
Cambodia.192 The Americans had accomplished their immediate goals of strengthening 
defenses with minimal communist interference and denying the NVA/VC their 
Cambodian safe haven.193  
C. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION 
 The OP 35 cross-border operations into Laos demonstrated the U.S. forces’ 
intelligence gap. Without concrete evidence to carry out cross-border raids, OP 35 
initially sought to compensate for indigenous forces’ ineffective reconnaissance 
operations and inability to call in air strikes against enemy targets.194 The CIA had little 
difficulty recruiting Hmong clans to join the covert effort. Facing hostility in the Laotian 
lowlands after the communists pushed them out of their mountain homes, the Hmong had 
little choice but to fight.195 Thus, in the Laotian context, the issue of intelligence was not 
so much the quantity, but the quality.  
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 MACVSOG controlled intelligence collection efforts over the border in 
Cambodia as part of Operation Daniel Boone.196 Through 1967, Operation Daniel Boone 
conducted 99 reconnaissance missions into Cambodia, resulting in 297 intelligence 
reports and two communists captured.197 By the time of Operation Rock Crusher, the 
enemy disposition in the area was quite evident. MACVSOG’s tactical intelligence was 
criticized as “worthless” despite the fact that SOG teams had avoided the target areas 
since October 1969 because NVA defenses within the Fishhook region of Cambodia had 
become almost impenetrable.198 In the lead up to Operation Rock Crusher, MACV 
authorized insertion of SOG recon teams up to thirty kilometers inside Cambodia.199  In 
addition to the mixed success of its intelligence collection efforts, MACVSOG was 
severely hampered by collaboration with South Vietnamese counterparts hired and vetted 
by the corrupt and compromised South Vietnamese National Police Force.200 
D. DURATION, OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE 
 The operational area for the Cambodian incursion was determined by the 
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the Cambodian government in April 
and May 1970, perhaps with U.S. involvement.201 The agreement stipulated that U.S. 
forces would go no deeper than thirty kilometers inside Cambodia, while RVN forces 
were authorized to operate from forty to sixty kilometers inside Cambodia.202 All U.S. 
forces were to withdraw from Cambodia on 30 June 1970.203  
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The U.S. leadership conceptualized the Cambodian incursion as measured in 
nature, to keep U.S. troop withdrawal plans on schedule. However, the purposes of the 
incursion were complex and ambitious:  to prevent the collapse of the Cambodian Khmer 
government at the hands of the NVA, to reduce the NVA’s ability to fight in both 
countries, to improve security in South Vietnam while enhancing Vietnamization, and to 
improve the chances of an early peace settlement.204 Operation Rock Crusher destroyed 
the illusion of Cambodian neutrality and changed the dynamic of the conflict. What had 
been simply the Vietnam War became in effect the Second Indochina War.205 The failure 
to expand the war effort against NVA/VC forces in Laos helped North Vietnam provide 
logistics to the south; the Laotian campaign wasn’t big enough.206 The lack of a 
conventional military footprint in Laos probably allowed the United States to conduct 
protracted operations in the region; the counterargument is Cambodia where the 
conventional military conduct of operations brought additional international attention.  
E. AMERICAN POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-
BORDER RAIDS 
 United States policy prevented the U.S. forces from conducting large-scale 
military actions in Cambodia while Prince Sihanouk was in power.207 Despite U.S. troop 
withdrawals from Vietnam, the Cambodian campaign created the perception that the war 
was expanding.208 American casualties had the greatest effect on public approval of the 
President and his Vietnam policy.209 The political implications of the Cambodian 
incursion reverberated throughout Washington and the United States. To some in 
Washington, Cambodia was “the straw that broke the camel’s back.”210 Protests erupted 
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across American college campuses, including Kent State and Jackson State where 
protestors were shot and killed by military and law enforcement officials. The political 
controversy reached a head in Congress, where legislators were angered by the apparent 
power imbalance between the legislative and executive branches.211 The manner in 
which the Cambodian offensive was planned, conducted, and politically portrayed 
damaged Richard Nixon’s presidency both domestically and internationally.212 
 The worsening military situation in Laos in the late 1960s threatened to turn the 
covert paramilitary war into a conventional one.213 The military activity in Laos was 
essentially a shadow war.214 U.S. politicians quickly identified the political ramifications 
of conducting a secret war in Laos. American diplomats in Laos were tasked with 
publicly proclaiming American adherence to Laotian neutrality while secretly directing a 
covert war.215 Despite the negative connotations of American military involvement in 
Laos, America’s Laotian policy did solidify Thai-U.S. relations and provided a military 
base of operations for years to come.216 
F. STRATEGIC-LEVEL INFORMATION 
The Johnson administration, to prevent accusations that America was expanding 
the Vietnam conflict, decided against using conventional ground forces to interdict North 
Vietnamese forces along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.217 The war in Laos was basically hidden 
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from the public and continued until around 1972.218 It was an interagency effort among 
the Departments of State and Defense, and the CIA. The overt military apparatus in 
Vietnam (MACV) was mostly out of the decision making process.219  This arrangement 
permitted greater deniability. The story in Vietnam monopolized media attention. The 
American contribution to the defense of Laos helped persuade the Laotian government to 
permit U.S. cross-border operations.220  
 President Nixon’s failure to properly prepare his cabinet members and the 
American public for the American foray into Cambodia added to the political distress that 
beset his presidency in 1970. Just days before the incursion began, Secretary of State 
William P. Rogers testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United 
States had no intention of conducting military operations in Cambodia.221 Rogers told the 
truth as he knew it; Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger deliberately excluded 
him from all discussions of the imminent operation.222 Congress, and by extension the 
American public, believed the Nixon administration had intentionally lied. Nixon tried to 
salvage his public image in the wake of the Cambodian campaign in a talk on 30 June, 
the day that all U.S. forces left of Cambodia. He made four key points:  North Vietnam 
brought the war to Cambodia, the NVA contributed to Sihanouk’s downfall, Sihanouk’s 
government and the Cambodian National Assembly deposed Sihanouk, and the United 
States endured the blatant violation of Cambodian neutrality for five years as the 
NVA/VC used Cambodia as a major base.223 But after years of war, thousands of 
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casualties, and serious challenges to his own legitimacy, Nixon’s attempt to justify the 
American attacks in Cambodia did not resonate with his American audience.224 
G. DURATION AND FORCE SIZE 
The conduct and nature of the cross-border force can mitigate the negative 
consequences of size and duration. From 1967 to 1970, SOG recon teams conducted 
1,300 patrols into Cambodia as part of the Daniel Boone/Salem House mission.225 The 
SOG missions did not grab the headlines like Operation Rock Crusher and it is easy to 
see why. Between late April and late June 1970, 109,267 ARVN and American soldiers 
crossed the border into Cambodia.226 Operation Rock Crusher was a brief part of the 
overall Vietnam conflict, but the sheer number of uniformed conventional forces crossing 
the border overshadowed the relatively short duration of their mission. In contrast, a large 
number of personnel conducted cross-border operations into Laos for six years, albeit 
with a different modus operandi. The SOG missions in Cambodia and Laos show the 
value of small-unit operations. Partnering with indigenous forces and shedding standard-
issue uniforms can increase force protection for the ground force and mitigate political 
repercussions.227 
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domestically and internationally. 
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H. NATIONAL WILL 
In 1954, the decision to support Ngo Dinh Diem and a unified Vietnam seemed 
sensible in light of the 1949 Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb and the communist 
victory in China.228 The American public found the war in Vietnam an acceptable 
response to perceived communist threats that might endanger the United States.229 This 
view is reflected in American news coverage of Vietnam. At first the news was 
predominantly pro-war, but support waned and anti-war coverage became more prevalent 
after the 1968 Tet Offensive.230 The American media reporting of the war casualties may 
be partially responsible for growing anti-war sentiment.231 New broadcasts of wounded 
and dying servicemen contributed to the decline in public support for the war. A lesson 
from Vietnam is that with widespread public support in the initial phases of a limited war, 
government officials can be lulled into complacency and not recognize problems that 
emerge when the number of casualties grows.232 
In conclusion, the cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia were not the 
only factor behind the changed direction of American involvement, but these operations 
did contribute to the change in U.S. policy. Both operations were seen by the public as an 
expansion of the war, and the additional deaths negated the incursions’ tactical and 
operational accomplishments. 
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I. THE TIMING AND TERMINATION OF AMERICAN CROSS-BORDER 
RAIDS IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS 
 Cross-border operations in Laos and Cambodia decreased as the United States 
stepped up its withdrawal from Vietnam. The war in Laos was always fought in the 
shadow of Vietnam, so when the United States indicated its pending departure from 
Vietnam in 1972 it was clear that Laotian operations would also cease.233 Operation 
Rock Crusher was a singular event in the conventional force fight in Cambodia, and 
MACVSOG operations ended with its deactivation in 1972.234 As noted above, 
SOG/SOF/CIA cross-border operations had been conducted since the start of hostilities 
and thus their timing is not as significant in this analysis. However, the timing of 
Operation Rock Crusher had significant repercussions, both positive and negative.  
 The communist North Vietnamese were surprised at the United States’ refusal to 
enter Cambodia earlier than 1970; they did not view the action as immoral and admitted 
they would have done the same if they were in the position of the U.S.235 On the one 
hand, the operation resulted in public outcry and accusations of war expansion and fed 
the urgency to withdraw American troops from Vietnam. On the other hand, the 
operation effectively delayed the communist takeover of South Vietnam by at least a 
year.236 The operation allowed time for additional training and equipping of ARVN 
forces to deter NVA aggression while permitting the United States to withdraw its forces 
and avoid an explicit military defeat.237  
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J. SUMMARY 
 The Laotian and Cambodian cross-border operations affected the war in Vietnam 
both internally and externally. Both campaigns sought to deny external sanctuaries the 
enemy needed.238 The Cambodian incursion was correctly described by President Nixon 
as “the most successful military operation of the Vietnam War.”239 However, American 
casualties and cries of war expansion overshadowed the operation’s tactical and 
operational successes; Laotian operations added fuel to the fire. Some internal reviews of 
the Cambodian campaign claim that the restrictions on the dissemination of MACVSOG 
Cambodia-intelligence products meant that the intelligence had value only for MACV 
analysts. The excessive security kept conventional ground units from getting information 
that could help them locate enemy caches and base camps.240 Overall, the small-unit 
operations of MACVSOG in Laos and Cambodia demonstrate the successful and 
efficient collection of intelligence and execution of direct action raids under strict 
political restrictions.241 The major lesson that many U.S. officials drew from the Vietnam 
War is that future interventions in Third World countries should be brief and decisive.242 
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Figure 6.  MACVSOG Areas of Operations in Laos243 
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VII. AFGHANISTAN (1978–1992) 
 The Soviet counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan is an example of a major 
power thwarted by guerrillas.246 The USSR focused its counterinsurgency campaign 
within the borders of Afghanistan. It was an open secret that the United States was 
supplying military aid to mujahedeen fighters in Pakistan. Nonetheless the Soviets 
practiced a containment policy, with sporadic artillery and air strikes and a number of 
ground-based operations against insurgent base camps in the porous 
Pakistan/Afghanistan border region. This chapter demonstrates that small scale cross-
border raids can be conducted without extensive negative repercussions. The case of the 
Soviets in Afghanistan shows how to mitigate the political cost of cross-border raids 
where the insurgent sanctuaries are supported by a powerful external actor. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 The Afghan insurgency began in April 1978 with the removal of President 
Mohammed Daoud Khan by the Afghan communist party, the People’s Democratic Party 
of Afghanistan (PDPA). Within the next year and half, the PDPA lost control of 23 of the 
28 Afghan provinces.247 Fearing the downfall of a neighboring pro-communist state, the 
Soviet Union launched a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. A decade 
later, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan after a flawed counterinsurgency 
campaign, intense international scrutiny and numerous allegations of atrocities against 
the Afghan people.248  
 The allegiances Afghanistan’s neighbors were quite dynamic prior to the Soviet 
invasion. Pakistan, the key mujahedeen sanctuary, was unallied; it eventually sided with 
the United States, calling the invasion a violation of Muslim state sovereignty by a 
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superpower.249 Iran had just expelled western powers with the onset of its own 
revolution. The Iranians provided safe haven to Afghan insurgents but their support was 
not as robust as the American aid to Afghan guerrillas in Pakistan.250 While the 550-mile 
Iran/Afghan border made it impossible for Iran to completely avoid the war completely, 
their attention was focused on their war with Iraq.251 Land routes into Afghanistan from 
China were cut off in Soviet-controlled Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.252  
B. SOVIET CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY 
 The Soviets threatened to invade Pakistan and Iran with “hot pursuit” raids into 
Pakistan as early as 1982.253  In December 1981 the Soviets were already conducting 
combined air and ground operations to cut off insurgent supply routes in the frontier 
regions.254 By 1983 the Pakistan/Afghan frontier had become a vast administrative base 
where the mujahedeen could acquire arms, train, receive medical attention and resettle 
their families.255 The Soviet approach to the Pakistani sanctuary included diplomatic 
threats backed by air raids and artillery barrages, buying off tribal leaders in border areas, 
and sealing the border with guard towers, fences and minefields.256 The Soviets also used 
Afghan surrogates in cross-border raids. One example is a 1981 incursion three miles 
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inside Pakistan by approximately 40 Afghans.257 By 1986, Soviet forces were skilled at 
attacking guerrilla sanctuaries and established a 30-mile deep no-man’s-land on the 
border.258 This forced mujahedeen fighters deeper into the Afghan refugee camps inside 
Pakistan, at least until the introduction of surface-to-air missiles.259  
C. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION 
 The scope of Soviet cross-border operations from 1981 through 1986 indicates 
robust intelligence on insurgent sanctuaries. An indirect indicator of Soviet intelligence 
proficiency is the intelligence agencies’ use of Afghan surrogates to conduct attacks 
inside refugee camps and Pakistani towns.260 The highly coordinated Soviet and Afghan 
offensive into the Parrot’s Beak border area in August 1985 shows that the Soviets could 
identify insurgent cross-border sanctuaries well within Pakistan. The operation was so 
successful in locating guerrilla base camps that it cleared the area of mujahedeen 
fighters.261 
D. DURATION, OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE 
 Soviet cross-border raids were generally quickly timed actions with limited 
objectives. They therefore combine operational duration, area, and size. Because the 
Soviets adopted a policy of “hot pursuit” with the rapid infiltration of helicopter-borne 
commandos and fighter aircraft, the duration of cross-border operations was almost 
                                                 
257 “Afghan Troops Raid Pakistan Town,” The Telegraph-Herald, 8 September 1981, 16, accessed 26 
February 2013, http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=NRlRAAAAIBAJ&sjid= 
CvgMAAAAIBAJ&pg=6710,948935&dq=soviet+hot+pursuit+raid+pakistan&hl=en. 
258 Bruscino, “Out of Bounds,” 62–64. Bruscino points out that the combined raids were a joint effort 
between fighter jets and helicopter gunships (Mi-24 HIND gunships had troop carrying capacity) and troop 
transport helicopters, specifically mentioning helicopter borne commandos, p. 59. It is not expressed 
specifically whether these helicopter borne commandos participated directly in all cross-border raids. For 
the purposes of this study, the assumption is made that they did in fact participate in a large percentage of 
such operations, but without expressed written information the exact number of operations, or a direct 
percentage cannot be determined.  
259 Scott R. McMichael, “The Soviet Army, Counterinsurgency, and the Afghan War,” Parameters 
19, no. 4 (December 1989), 31. Through 1985, as many as 700 Soviet helicopters were destroyed on the 
ground and in the air. The introduction of U.S. Stinger missiles greatly increased the threat to Soviet 
aircraft.  
260 Bruscino, “Out of Bounds,” 61. 
261 Bruscino, “Out of Bounds,” 62. 
 66 
always brief, a few hours or at most a day. The area which the Soviets could occupy 
during these raids was small. (The Parrot’s Beak attack is an exception, [not to be 
confused with the area of the same name in Cambodia]. The duration and size of the 
operation is unknown, but a two-pronged attack in such a large area would require 
several days at least.)  The force stayed within prescribed limits on the mission’s area of 
operation and duration. In a March 1986 raid, the 334th and 154th Spetsnaz battalions 
reportedly sustained casualties of at least 60 killed and two missing in action over four 
days.262  It appears that the Soviet rarely if exceeded a few days of temporary cross-
border occupation.  
With an inadequate force size and structure, the Soviets could not control key 
terrain for long periods.263 They never deployed more than 200,000 Soviet and Soviet-
backed Afghan soldiers in the Afghan conflict. At its peak, upwards of 85 percent of the 
Soviet force provided basic security, leaving 18,000 to 23,000 soldiers to conduct 
counterinsurgency operations.264  Small helicopter-borne raiding parties aside, the 
Soviets utilized an assault force tailored around battalion-sized operations. It is not 
known how many battalion-sized operations occurred in addition to the Parrots Beak and 
March 1986 Spetsnaz operations.265  
In short, the Soviets gained tangible security benefits from short-term cross-
border raids by small forces on focused operational areas. Their increased reliance on air 
power bombing raids was frustrated by the introduction of Stinger missiles, which proved 
crucial for keeping open the logistical lines between Pakistan and Afghanistan.266  
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E. SOVIET POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-BORDER 
RAIDS 
 The Soviets conducted cross-border raids to isolate the guerrillas from external 
support.267 They identified the sanctuary in Pakistan as critical to the mujahedeen 
resistance.268 However, the Soviets already faced intense international scrutiny of their 
invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet/Afghan cross-border raids into Pakistan lent 
additional weight to U.S. condemnation and strengthened Pakistani resolve. The tenacity 
with which the Soviets attacked the sanctuaries resulted in U.S. diplomatic actions that 
raised the political costs to the Soviet Union.   
F. STRATEGIC-LEVEL INFORMATION 
 The international community’s strong condemnation of the Soviet occupation 
emphasized that cross-border raids were an additional violation of international law. The 
Soviet air attacks into Pakistan received extensive media coverage that fed criticism of 
Soviet activities.269 However, the mention of small-scale cross-border raids appears to 
have received little international attention. The March 1986 Spetsnaz raid was barely 
mentioned in the April 1986 Pakistani Strategic Studies Review. It is possible the raid did 
not become a larger political issue because the Pakistani authorities did not know of the 
operation, or simply did not want to make an issue of it.270 Although the Soviet 40th 
Army barred future attacks on Krer, reportedly because the March raid was unsanctioned, 
the Soviet forces again attacked the Krer base camp in December 1987. The success of 
the Soviets’ small-scale raids may be been due to their politically costly large-scale 
bombing campaign. 
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G. DURATION AND FORCE SIZE 
The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan was one more instance of the Soviets taking 
military control of a neighboring country after World War II. The invasion generated 
strong political resistance from the United States.271 The expansion of the war into 
Pakistan lent credence to the United States’ rhetoric against communist expansionism. 
Because the USSR flagrantly violated Pakistani sovereignty hundreds of times within a 
few months, it became increasingly difficult for the Soviets to counteract U.S. news 
reports of increased border violations. The relatively small force size had little direct 
influence on the rhetoric compared to the overall duration of Soviet cross-border raids. 
Persistent and repeated short-duration attacks looked like a single continuous event 
composed of numerous small engagements. The series of small force, short term, limited 
raids meant that no single event could be pegged as the Soviets making good on their 
threat to invade Pakistan. 
H. NATIONAL WILL 
Sometime in 1987 the Soviet leadership determined that their army would never 
leave Afghanistan with a legitimate, viable PDPA regime.272 Political factors that 
contributed to the Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan include the narrow base 
of Afghan support for the PDPA, greater unity within Afghan society, and the 
mujahedeen’s cohesiveness and combat effectiveness. Also important were American 
bipartisan support for aid to the guerrillas, and Pakistan’s commitment to the Afghan 
resistance despite Soviet attempts at intimidation.273 In the end, it wasn’t so much that 
the costs of staying in Afghanistan outweighed the costs of leaving. Rather, the costs of 
staying in Afghanistan outweighed the USSR’s long term domestic and global 
interests.274 
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The Soviets’ domestic and international status was severely damaged by their 
actions in Afghanistan, and their violation of Pakistani sovereignty exacerbated the 
problem. The invasion of Afghanistan led to embargoes on grain and advanced 
technology with varying degrees of impact on Soviet domestic conditions. The invasion 
also affected the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks II (SALT II) treaty, stalling its 
progress through the U.S. Senate.275 Finally, the invasion helped justify increased U.S. 
arms spending, thus escalating the arms race and burdening the already fragile Soviet 
economy.276  
I. THE TIMING AND TERMINATION OF SOVIET CROSS-BORDER 
RAIDS IN PAKISTAN 
 The timing of the Soviet cross-border raids is best summarized as successful in 
thwarting guerrilla operations early in the war, but extremely costly from a political 
viewpoint. The early raids produced extensive security gains as mujahedeen fighters 
retreated away from the border. But the fact that the Soviets entered Pakistan early on 
helped justify charges of gross disregard for Pakistani sovereignty. The violation of 
territorial sovereignty created sympathy for Pakistan and led to greater material support 
for the insurgents.  
Cross-border air attacks continued through at least August 1988.277 It seems clear 
that the frequency of cross-border operations over a period of at least seven years created 
a political burden that hastened the Soviet withdrawal. It appears that cross-border raids 
by ground troops were scaled back in response to the depth of the strikes, as well as the 
reduction of Soviet combat forces in the theater. 
J. SUMMARY 
 The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan not because of a military defeat, but 
because of a military stalemate, internal political dynamics and external pressures.278 To 
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suggest that cross-border raids were the major cause of Soviet withdrawal would give too 
much credit to U.S. diplomacy and too little credit to the failure of the Soviets’ ruthless 
counter-insurgency campaign.279 The initial cross-border raids yielded significant 
security gains, but the political costs mounted as the Soviets expanded their forays into 
Pakistan. The rare mention of small-unit cross-border operations implies that, even under 
great scrutiny, such raids can be successful at little political cost if they are limited in 
scope and duration. Whether this is true of the Soviet cross-border raids in the Afghan 
war cannot be determined because the ground operations were overshadowed by a large 
aerial bombing campaign during the same period. But the fact that these ground-based 
operations attracted little international condemnation indicates that some such raids can 
be conducted with impunity.280  
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Figure 9.  Sanctuaries on the Afghanistan/Pakistan Border.281  
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Figure 10.  Parrot’s Beak Region on Afghanistan/Pakistan Border.282  
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND POLITICAL 
COST REDUCTION LESSONS 
In a successful cross-border raid, the security gain must outweigh the political 
cost. Every cross-border raid will involve some political cost, but these costs can 
sometimes be mitigated through diplomatic means and diligent strategic and operational-
level planning. While there are no hard and fast rules for lowering the political costs 
associated with cross-border raids, a comparison of the different types of raids suggests 
that some are more likely to minimize these costs. The cases of cross-border raids 
presented in this thesis have both common and unique characteristics that suggest 
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- Strong condemnation 
from neighboring 
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Lessons 
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- Often combined 
with indigenous 
security forces 
- Strong condemnation 
from the U.S. (cut off 
military aid to SADF) 
- Strong condemnation 
from Cuba (increased 
aid to the Angolan 
government; Cuba 





border raids in an 
anti-communist 
narrative 
- Did not overstep 
international 
redlines (e.g., 
announced limit of 
advance for SADF 
by Cuban forces) 




Political Costs Political Cost Reduction 
Lessons 
- Generally small in 
size 
- Mostly covert 
- One large overt 
operation 








legitimacy of the 
U.S. president (war 
expansion) 
- U.S. casualties 
undermined public 
support 



























Political Costs Political Cost Reduction 
Lessons 
- Generally small in 
size 
- Short duration 
- No occupation 





and artillery barrages 
- Strong 
condemnation from 
the U.S. (e.g. 






of U.S. arms) 
- Diversions to mask 
intent 
- Robust intelligence 
- Never occupied 
Pakistan 
Table 8.   Security/Political Cost Lessons: Afghanistan (1978–1992) 
 Interesting trends within the context of each individual conflict can be seen on 
both the political and security-return scales. The scales imply that some techniques can be 
successful when the nuances are taken into account. In the category of security returns 
(information, duration, operational area, and force), the independent and dependent 
variables fall on the low end in the Algerian and Malayan conflicts. In the Algerian case, 
the independent variable, expenditures, were limited by the inward focus of the 
counterinsurgency campaign. The same can be said for the Malayan insurgency. 
Surprisingly, the well-executed internally-focused control measures outweighed the 
security gains from cross-border raids. If possibly more emphasis had been placed on any 
of the independent variables, the effectiveness of the cross-border operations might have 
increased.  
Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Afghanistan are interesting because they all are close to 
ideal locations on the scales. This implies that they were competent and efficient at 
integrating cross-border raids into their counterinsurgency strategy. In these cases, the 
Cold War added to the urgency when a superpower became involved to thwart the 
advances of their Cold War adversary. In some instances, the principal actors’ activities 




Figure 11.  Applied Security Environment  
 
 Skewed results are more common in the politics subcategories. The variables of 
national will and information show strikingly skewed results. All of the conflicts except 
Malaya contained events like human rights atrocities or a changing domestic political 
landscape that greatly influenced domestic or international information processing. At the 
same time, these nations’ own strategic narratives were not entirely in line with public 
opinion and were often inconsistent with the true intent of the counterinsurgency. In all of 
these cases, state actors failed to produce sound, explicit strategic messaging that could 
deflect external pressure and quell domestic discontent. The Soviet Union was close to 
the ideal location in terms of information, but this was somewhat deceptive given the 
oppressive nature of Soviet society.  
 The duration and force size charts indicate that short duration operations and 
small force size increase political returns. These cases include Vietnam, Afghanistan, and 
Nicaragua for both variables and Malaya for the force size variable. Vietnam and 
Afghanistan pushed the limits of duration and are on the slope of diminishing returns. 
Both increased their cross-border operations almost exponentially; both tried for the 
quick win instead of a more deliberate covert action plan. This does mean that a “go big, 
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or go home” covert action plan for cross-border incursions from day one is most 
advantageous. Short duration individual operations can be sustained for a prolonged 
period if combined with appropriate diplomatic efforts. The Sandinistas also kept their 
operations short. It is likely that both Honduras and Pakistan were emboldened to stand 
against cross-border raids by their neighbors only because of American involvement. 
 
Figure 12.  Applied Political Environment 
B. THE TIMING OF CROSS-BORDER RAIDS 
 The timing of cross-border raids does not have a direct correlation with their 
success within a larger counterinsurgency campaign. The way that timing a cross-border 
raid reduces political costs and increases security gains is through the actual execution of 
the operation, rather than the timing. For the most part, however, the greatest security 
gains and lowest political cost are found when cross-border raids come early in the 
conflict. This is probably because the international community is overwhelmed by the 
news at the start of a war. The details of cross-border operations pale in comparison to 
headlines about the larger conflict.  
Namibia, Vietnam, and Afghanistan are examples where early cross-border 
campaigns with greater latitude for execution produced measureable security gains. In the 
 79 
case of Vietnam, the Laotian campaign’s effectiveness was only as good as the 
manpower committed. The Cambodian campaign’s later execution allowed for 
considerable security gains, but was politically costly. Malayan/Thai cross-border raids 
began somewhat later in the counterinsurgency paradigm, producing minimal security 
gains at limited political cost. France’s only true cross-border operation, Sakiet, was 
conducted after an effective barrier was established; it produced minimal security gains at 
extensive political cost. Lastly, the Sandinista raids into Honduras had considerable 
security gains in terms of the counterinsurgency, but detrimental effects in terms of 
political costs including stepped-up American involvement and retaliatory strikes by the 
Honduran government. 
 
Figure 13.  Strategic and Operational Implications 
 The lessons for reducing political costs and increasing security gains in the 
conduct of cross-border raids involve internal and external actions at both the strategic 
and operational levels. The actions to mitigate political costs must be taken before, 
during, and after the execution of the operation.   
C. INTERNAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Because they require continuity in information, training, and expertise, internal 
operational measures generally reoccur throughout the duration of activities and post-
conflict. The existence of dedicated raid units allows cross-border raids to be conducted 
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early in a conflict because no time is needed to establish headquarters and strike forces 
capable of managing and executing the operational requirements. The Soviets’ 
helicopter-borne operations early in the Afghan conflict provide the best example of this 
technique. The United States in Vietnam validated the effectiveness of pairing Army 
Green Berets with indigenous forces for cross-border operations. The grueling selection 
of Green Berets and their unconventional warfare training meshed well the requirements 
for such combined unconventional operations. 
Joint military and interagency cooperation is another internal factor that requires 
recurring collaboration. The advantage of a joint/interagency approach is seen in the 
Malayan and Vietnam case studies. In both conflicts, the joint/interagency approach 
helped bridge the gap between military objectives, reducing political costs by bringing 
the whole-of-government approach to support execution of tactical activities. In both 
cases, the diplomatic efforts at strategic-level containment supported combined efforts at 
operational positioning of forces, mission planning, and execution. Thailand provided 
security forces for border operations during the Malayan conflict and the Vietnam War as 
a result of the interagency/whole-of-government approach. Thailand’s involvement eased 
British political costs in Malaya and advanced U.S. in Laos during the Vietnam War. 
Internal factors to consider during cross-border raids include both conflict-
specific aspects and chronic states. Operational autonomy and flexibility must be an 
enduring condition. This old lesson bears repeating. Special Operations forces must have 
the latitude to execute operations apart from the conventional fight (in this context, a 
conventional fight refers to operations within the borders of the disputed country). The 
nuances of cross-border operations require coordination and skills not normally fostered 
within the conventional force; again Vietnam is a prime example. Conventional forces 
may be able to augment operations without increasing political costs (the Soviets in 
Afghanistan or the British and Australians in Malaya are examples). Important here is the 
delineation of command at the operational level so that the forces can properly support 
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the desired end state. The over-synchronization of SOF and conventional forces should 
be avoided so SOF do not become too “conventionalized” and lose their effectiveness.283 
The more nuanced conflict-specific considerations within the internal dynamic 
arise with synchronization between conventional units and the units conducting cross-
border raids and diversion operations. There are two requirements for synchronization 
between these different units. First, the cross-border operations should support 
conventional force operations within the disputed nation. Intelligence from MACVSOG 
in support of Operation Rock Crusher was criticized by the conventional force because it 
lacked tactical value. This was largely due to over-classification, but lack of coordination 
between MACVSOG and MACV is also a factor. A communication/intelligence bridge 
between the two would have helped fill intelligence gaps for the conventional forces that 
crossed into Cambodia. Second, conventional force operations can help create diversions 
to support cross-border raids. Properly coordinated conventional force operations can 
mask short duration cross-border strikes. The Soviets conducted focused strikes inside 
Pakistan under the veil of larger conventional force operations along the border. 
Similarly, the British successfully hid larger scope border operations with regular PSYOP 
over flights to mask bombers supporting operations on the ground.  
Short duration operations are most effective in reducing political costs. In all of 
the case studies except Namibia and to some extent the Cambodia, short duration cross-
border raids protected the principal actors from the inevitable political consequences of 
being labeled an occupying force. Furthermore, in long-duration operations, intent can 
easily be called into question. Short duration operations allow clearer framing of desired 
goals and more convincing justifications for strategic messaging.  
D. EXTERNAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
External operational-level mitigation techniques are conflict dependent and 
require a specific focus before, during, and after execution. External operational factors 
                                                 
283 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 176. Rothstein points out that when SOF become too involved with 
conventional forces, their ability to work in an “innovative fashion” is diminished by the conventional 
hierarchy of direct action over unconventional warfare. A balanced separation is required to maintain SOF 
autonomy,  innovation, and influence on indigenous forces.  
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may include building indigenous intelligence networks, minimizing potentially revealing 
indicators of cross-border raids, and saturating the environment with false signals.  
Building indigenous intelligence networks requires preparation in advance of the 
cross-border raids. Although it appears there are no direct linkages between indigenous 
intelligence collection and a specific cross-border operation, the SADF in Namibia 
utilized UNITA informants in Angola to develop the intelligence picture before and after 
SADF entered Angola. Indigenous intelligence networks were instrumental in the 
disposition of forces in all of the case studies. The augmentation of intelligence adds to 
the information used in weighing the anticipated security gains against the likely political 
costs. Building indigenous intelligence networks before, during, and after an operation 
requires an interagency approach.284 Malaya, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Namibia are 
cases where the indigenous intelligence network actively participated in intelligence 
collection that led to focused cross-border raids. Indigenous intelligence networks can 
also help preserve tactical forces by sharing cultural information that can affect the 
mission.  
The use of false signals is akin to nesting cross-border operations within the 
general conduct of larger operations. The British PSYOP aircraft and the Soviet examples 
discussed earlier exemplify the use of everyday operations to hide cross-border 
operations. Simply stated, they demonstrate the utility of deception operations in support 
of cross-border operations.  
 During and after cross-border raids it is imperative to prevent “mission creep” and 
minimize collateral damage. MACVSOG’s mission parameters were fairly well-defined 
in Vietnam and for the most part it stuck to those specific mission sets. As a result, the 
political costs of operating within Laos were more easily mitigated through the 
interagency approach. In contrast, SADF cross-border operations into Angola grew from 
a few limited engagements to a full blown occupation of a large portion of the country. 
The SADF case is an extreme example of mission creep, clearly demonstrating how small 
changes in the mission can snowball if operational success is not held in check.  
                                                 
284 Department of Defense, Field Manual 3–24.2, 3–1 – 3–4. 
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Finally, the issue of collateral damage is best demonstrated in the examples of the 
French attack on Sakiet and the SADF assault on the SWAPO camp at Cassinga. At 
Cassinga, collateral damage, measured in civilian deaths and human rights violations, 
overshadowed the security gains achieved on the ground. In the Sakiet case, the French 
decided not to use ground forces for fear of political repercussions. In retrospect, using 
soldiers rather than aerial bombs might have cost less politically. A small number of 
border violations are often easily dismissed after argumentative but largely benign 
political rhetoric (e.g., Pakistan and the Soviets).  
E. INTERNAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 
Internal strategic mitigation factors also require a whole-of-government approach. 
Sound strategic messaging (frame alignment) is imperative in linking the targets to a 
broader national security goal. In the United States, conflict-specific strategic messaging 
should complement the National Defense Strategy. In the event of an unexpected conflict, 
the targets and broader security environment should be defined so they can be supported 
by all government agencies. Malaya, the Laotian campaign in Vietnam, and Namibia are 
three instances where broad strategic messaging helped support the interagency approach 
and created support (albeit temporary) for cross-border operations.  
Clearly-defined sanctions against foreign aggressors can justify potential cross-
border raids. This will help the domestic legitimacy of over-the-border operations. These 
political or tactical trigger points provide the most flexibility in the conduct of cross-
border raids when they are defined early in the conflict or properly framed when 
preceding a projected cross-border operation. An example where punishment for 
noncompliance affected political costs is the Sakiet raid and the forced grounding of the 
aircraft transporting FLN leadership. If France had properly articulated the punishment 
for supporting insurgents, its cross-border operations may have been seen as legitimate 
limited encroachments onto foreign soil; this narrative might have had a positive effect 
on domestic public opinion.   
During cross-border operations, the government should maintain political will 
through information operations justifying cross-border raids from a strategic perspective. 
This can be accomplished by presenting the positive impact of cross-border operations on 
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the counterinsurgency and on regional or global security. The SEATO agreement was 
used in both Malaya and Vietnam to frame operations inside Thailand and Laos. The 
leveraging of SEATO helped justify international cooperation in combating insurgents in 
nations outside the core disputed areas, presenting the conflict in a manner designed to 
influence domestic public support.   
F. EXTERNAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 
External strategic political cost moderation requires ongoing, focused political 
and military activities before and during conflict. Cooperation from neighboring 
countries may involve a continuum of measures, from discreet concessions to active 
assistance with border security. Diplomatic activities at the strategic level are necessary 
to gain compliance. The SEATO agreement produced active Thai backing for both the 
British and American wars in Southeast Asia. The United States’ interagency approach in 
Laos was quite effective. There, CIA and MACVSOG units planned and executed 
operations with the approval of the U.S. ambassador, who coordinated with the Laotian 
leadership. Operational approval by the ambassador may not be appropriate in every 
circumstance, but at minimum the Ambassador’s input should be recognized so that 
Embassy efforts are appropriately aligned. Political cost mitigation occurs at all levels of 
government; the most influential persons do not necessarily hold the highest rank.  
 International diplomacy is not limited to compliance from neighboring nations. 
Diplomacy can also help reduce the potential for sanctions or mitigate their effects. The 
U.S. imposed major sanctions on the South African government that seriously impacted 
its ability to wage war. Had South Africa expended more resources to build its case to the 
international audience, it might have held on to U.S. support or created opportunities for 
material support from other nations, but this is unlikely due to South Africa’s internal 
policy of apartheid.285 The Sandinistas had to do just that: after they were denied aid 
from the United States, they found support from their less preferred option, the Soviet 
Union.  
                                                 
285 Jannie Geldenhuys, At the Front: A General’s Account of South Africa’s Border War 
(Johannesburg, South Africa: Jonathan Ball Publishers [PTY] LTD, 2009), 333–334. 
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 Diplomacy is also essential for attempts to block or disrupt support or aid from a 
sympathetic state—”broad containment.” Broad containment can reduce a states’ ability 
to support insurgency in neighboring countries. The French in Algeria demonstrated 
small scale containment, but failed to expand the concept to neighboring Tunisia and 
Morocco. The French should have made greater efforts to diplomatically isolate Tunisia 
and Morocco. South Africa failed to diplomatically isolate Angola; the result was an 
escalation of hostilities and the transfer of new weaponry to the Angolan military. The 
Angolan case called for isolating Angola from Soviet-backed Cuba. The South African 
government had difficulty framing its expansive military policies as purely anti-Soviet 
because their policies were perceived as racially motivated.  
 Occupation can negate even the best strategic messaging. South Africa’s 
occupation of Angola demonstrates that no strategic message can overcome the political 
costs of occupation. The two month-old Cambodian campaign undermined the U.S. 
strategic message about its role in Vietnam. Occupying governments must justify 
expanding the war. The loss of blood and treasure will be immediately questioned at 
home, and the occupation often focuses additional attention on the counterinsurgency 
being fought elsewhere. Short duration operations negate many arguments of occupation, 
but if not properly managed—if, for example, there is mission creep—even short-
duration operations may be perceived war expansion. Cross-border raids can continue for 
years, as in Laos, if they are properly managed, coordinated, and signaled.  
G. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 The complex political and military dynamics of the Cold War influenced all the 
insurgencies discussed in this thesis. Either the United States or the Soviet Union 
provided the bulk of the material to most of the insurgents; more often than not, either the 
United States or the Soviet Union imposed the greatest international political costs on 
cross-border operations. As small nations assert stronger cases for sovereignty in the 
post-Cold War world, most lessons from the cases examined in this thesis remain 
relevant. The United States, the only remaining superpower, must decide how to interact 
with weaker nations when cross-border operations are deemed necessary to national 
security.   
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The investment in indigenous intelligence networks complements the current 
posture of United States SOF around the globe.286  An interagency approach will 
establish an environment conducive to conducting cross-border operations should the 
need arise because “effective networks are best created before a crisis.”287 Furthermore, 
investing in an interagency approach to foreign cooperation before hostilities occur will 
allow the U.S. to more effectively leverage international support, thus reducing the 
political costs of controversial operations like cross-border raids and combined operations 
in a counterterrorism setting. Investments at both the operational and strategic levels will 
produce the greatest results. 
Dedicated raiding units require dedicated investments in personnel and material. 
Such units can include SOF or specially trained conventional forces. In Vietnam, the 
Green Berets’ unconventional warfare training made their operations effective; the 
dynamics of current covert Special Missions Units are different. Decision makers should 
be cautious about investing too much in direct action. Overemphasis on direct action 
raids, cross-border and otherwise, has a negative effect on public opinion in 
counterinsurgency settings. The Green Berets’ value in Vietnam came from their skill at 
unconventional warfare as well as their direct action missions.288 Units specializing in 
direct action are not ideal for unconventional warfare settings. To maintain flexibility in 
the operating environment and prevent overreliance on any one specialty or approach to 
conflict, the military should recognize that some operational tasks, including 
unconventional warfare operations, require unique skill sets.  
The whole-of-government/interagency approach is necessary for framing the 
narrative of conflict to reduce the political costs of cross-border raids. Information 
operations associated with cross-border raids should emphasize the larger security 
context. It is not necessary that the narrative reveal covert operations, only that it provide 
                                                 
286 United States Special Operations Command, Global SOF White Paper, 15 February 2013: The 
Global Special Operations Forces Network (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 
2013). In response to the changing global security environment, U.S. Special Operations Command is re-
posturing forces in collaboration with the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), U.S. interagency 
partners, and international partners.  
287 United States Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command 2020 
(Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2013), 1.  
288 Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare, 175–176. 
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sound justification should the operations be exposed. With the whole-of-government 
participation in this paradigm, interagency partners will become more invested in the 
outcome, and interagency efforts will better complement each other.  
In coming years, military and political responses to insurgency, counterterrorism, 
and unconventional warfare will likely include consideration of cross-border raids. Only 
a small percentage of internal wars end at the negotiating table; most end on the 
battlefield.289 The lessons learned in the case studies described in this research can help 
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APPENDIX: CASE STUDY SELECTION 
 
Figure 14.  Logic for Assignment of Case Outcomes290 
                                                 





Table 9.   The 89 Insurgencies and Case Selection Criteria 
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